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I.

INTRODUCTION

From beginning to end businesses are wed to the law. The life
of a corporation typically begins with the filing of articles of
incorporation with the secretary of state' and ends with either a
merger into another corporation 2 or dissolution. 3 At every point in a
corporation's life cycle, the American legal system places its
imprimatur on the corporation's activities and governance. Inevitably,
because of the sophisticated nature of business and frequent
encounters with the law, businesses become engaged in their fair
share of litigation and must resort to the judicial system for
resolution.
Business, especially high-tech business, moves very quickly,
and time is almost always of the essence. Investors consume data
rapidly and evaluate and sell shares at the touch of a button. Thus,
the market price of listed stock almost immediately reflects every
corporate action. 4 Corporations and employees must therefore act
quickly to assure investors and avoid a decline in stock prices and
profits. The unresolved issues created by existing lawsuits can
jeopardize corporate profits and share prices; thus quick resolution of
disputes becomes all the more important as business speed increases.
A business's reliance on the law provides states with an avenue
to make their forum more attractive as a state of location or
incorporation. Corporate law is primarily state law, with a few notable

1.

See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101 (2001).

2.

See § 251.

3.

See § 273.

4.
CHARLES R.T. OKELLEY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS 167-74 (3d ed. 1999).
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exceptions. 5 Further, state law controls many other legal aspects of
the corporate existence, including contract law, certain aspects of
employment law, trade secret law, covenants not to compete, and tort
law. States therefore have a great deal of control over the legal
system's approach to business and business-related litigation.
Delaware's experience as a pioneer in using this control to shape
corporate law and policy so as to encourage businesses to incorporate
there has been quite successful. 6 These efforts have been so successful,
in fact, that more than sixty percent of Fortune 500 companies have
7
incorporated in Delaware.
The new wave of high-tech businesses has led states to
reconsider their own corporate law and tailor it to attract high-tech
business to incorporate or locate in their states.8 Many commentators
have referred to this movement as the "race for corporate charters."9
However, new scholarship questions whether states actually compete
for corporate charters.10 This Note takes the position that regardless
of actual or perceived competition for corporate charters, states should
focus on attracting businesses to locate, not incorporate, in their
states. Such a move would likely be more successful than competing
with Delaware for corporate charters and would provide more benefits
for the forum states. This Note draws on the court reform proposals of
two states, Michigan and Maryland, as potential methods of luring
high-tech businesses into forum states.1 1 This Note then evaluates the
probability that each method will entice businesses to incorporate in

5.
Examples include federal securities law, antitrust law, and bankruptcy law.
Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV.
6.
709, 720 (1987) (noting that Delaware enjoys advantages because it was the first mover in the
race for corporate charters).
7.
Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters,68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2000); see also Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware
Still a Haven For Incorporation?,20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 965, app. (1995) presenting statistics and
tables showing the large number of incorporations and reincorporations in Delaware).
8.
See Victoria Rivkin, ABA NETWORK, Courting Tech Business, available at
http://www.abanet.org/journal/julO1/fcyber.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
9.
This term finds its roots in the Cary-Winter debate over whether the competition to
obtain corporate charters is a race to the bottom or a race to the top. For Cary and Winter's
arguments, see William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974), and Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection and the
Theory of the Corporation,6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-62 (1977).
10. See generally Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in
Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 (2002) (arguing that, Delaware aside, competition is a myth
because no state has taken significant steps to attract corporations, and no state stands to gain
meaningful tax revenues or legal business from chartering firms).
11. See Governor John Engler, State of the State Address (Jan. 31, 2001), available at
http://www.michigan.gov/gov/1,1431,7-103-705-1931-M_2001_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 12,
2002).
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the respective forum state, and in addition, whether high-tech
businesses will be more likely to locate in each state.
In Part II, this Note describes Delaware's success in the race
for corporate charters. Part III of this Note will explore the
development of specialized business courts and speed-enhancing
rocket dockets and, in Part IV, the increased use of technology in the
court system. After a firm grounding in the means by which courts
have previously addressed business needs, in Part V this Note
describes how Michigan and Maryland combine specialized business
courts, procedural devices that promote efficiency, and technology to
create courts designed to appeal to high-tech businesses. In Part VI,
this Note explores Delaware's achievements in order to develop a
framework for analyzing the Michigan and Maryland approaches.
After analyzing how Michigan and Maryland compare to Delaware in
terms of general corporate law, in Part VII the Note concludes that
Michigan and Maryland have a better chance for success than other
business courts but may need to restate and refocus their goals toward
inducing businesses to locate in their states. Finally, this Note makes
recommendations for states considering specialized business tribunals
and remarks on how the experience in these specialized courts may be
able to improve the court system as a whole, even if they are
ultimately unsuccessful in drawing corporations to their states.
II. THE DELAWARE COURT OF CHANCERY: AMERICA'S FIRST
"SPECIALIZED BUSINESS COURT"

It is no secret that other states envy Delaware's grip on
corporate law.12 This grip is largely the result of the Delaware Court of
Chancery and its emergence as the preeminent forum for corporate
disputes in the United States. 13 The Delaware Court of Chancery is by
far the oldest specialized court in the nation, even though it was not
14
specifically designed to be specialized.
1
5
Unlike other states, Delaware did not create the Court of
Chancery expressly to resolve business litigation. Instead, the court
evolved into a specialized business court as a natural result of

12. Id.
13. See William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the
State-FederalJoint Venture of ProvidingJustice, 48 BUS. LAW. 351, 354 (1992).
14. Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15
DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 902-03 (1990); Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of
Specialized Courts in Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 5 (1995).
15. See infra Part III.

2003]

BUSINESS LITIGATION AND CYBERSPACE

565

16
Delaware's early decision not to merge its courts of law and equity 17
and the influx of corporations into Delaware early in its history.
Delaware's practices, from a structural standpoint, have remained
relatively unchanged. In fact the only modification to Delaware's court
system, in the procedural as opposed to substantive law sense, has
gone virtually unused since its inception.' 8 The Court of Chancery has
jurisdiction over all actions in equity; its jurisdiction therefore is not
limited to business cases, but also includes, inter alia, civil rights
actions seeking injunctive relief and guardianships. 9 The court's
business expertise is a by-product of the equitable nature of many
business disputes including the duty of disclosure and the duty of good
faith, as well as Delaware's treatment of class actions and shareholder
derivative disputes as equitable in nature. 20 The Court of Chancery's
specialization therefore resulted from its jurisdictional boundaries and
its early caseload.
While the Delaware Court of Chancery is unique because of the
continuing division between law and equity in Delaware, 21 other
factors also contribute to its success as a corporate forum. The Court
of Chancery sits without a jury, and appeals from the court go directly
to the Delaware Supreme Court. 22 The appeals process creates a
system of quick and consistent dispute resolution because litigants
deal with a limited number of judicial viewpoints from one chancellor,

16. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 5. See generally Maurice A. Hartnett, III, The History of
the Delaware Court of Chancery, 48 Bus. LAW. 367 (providing a brief overview of the Delaware
Court of Chancery's history).
17. See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chancery-1 792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819, 831-34 (1993) (describing the transition of the
court of chancery into the nineteenth century and its emergence as a forum for litigating
corporate disputes).
18. See Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More Efficient
Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947, 956 (1997). In April of 1994, Delaware created a specialized
business litigation panel, made up of trial judges from its superior courts and the Delaware
Court of Chancery. Id. Delaware directed the panel to hear controversies that involve more than
one million dollars and in which at least one party is a Delaware citizen. Id. Parties using this
panel agree to waive jury trial rights and the opportunity to seek punitive damages. Id. As of
July of 1996, no parties had submitted cases to the panel. Delaware's most overt action designed
to attract businesses to incorporate in Delaware was a revision of their corporate law statute in
1967, but those statutory maneuvers are beyond the scope of this Note. See Douglas M. Branson,
Indeterminacy: The Final Ingredient in an Interest Group Analysis of Corporate Law, 43 VAND. L.
REV. 85, 88-92 (1990) (discussing the explanations for Delaware's dominance in corporate law).
19. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 5; see also DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 341 (2001); Monroe Park v. Metro. Life Ins., 457 A.2d 734, 738 (Del. 1983) (noting that under
Delaware's constitution, the court of chancery has jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters
and causes in equity).
20. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 25.
21. See Monroe Park, 457 A.2d at 738.
22. Alva, supra note 14, at 903.
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four vice-chancellors, and five Delaware Supreme Court justices. 23 The
limited number of judges deciding cases and the right of direct appeal
to the supreme court, when coupled with Delaware's long history as a
corporate forum and its associated line of precedent, make it a
24
structurally attractive forum for litigating corporate disputes.
Delaware's unique judicial structure and long history as a
corporate forum make it a difficult model to transport to other states,
however. 25 States cannot easily copy Delaware's processes, because
even if a state wished to separate its courts of law and equity, such a
step would likely require revising and restructuring the state's court
system from top to bottom. This restructuring would upset longstanding tradition and would most likely be met with great
resistance. 26 Such a structural change would not be limited to business
disputes, but would affect every case brought before the state's
tribunals. 27 Structural and procedural concerns aside, the wholesale
adoption of Delaware statutes or case law would not put a state on par
with Delaware. Much of the value of Delaware law derives from
intangible factors, including the nuanced way in which it is applied to
novel facts, making it difficult to emulate without a judiciary
28
experienced in its application.
Separating the courts of law and equity would likely require
amendments to the state constitution and might not actually result in
specialization. Thus, states must turn to different methods in order to
compete with Delaware. In choosing those methods, states must
analyze and consider the actual and perceived benefits of Delaware's
system rather than the means by which Delaware has achieved its
success. 29 States and scholars continue to struggle to identify the
factors that have led to Delaware's success and to determine alternate
means of providing litigants with those same benefits. Before
comparing Michigan's and Maryland's courts to Delaware's system, it
will be helpful to provide a general overview of the various means that
other courts have proposed. After examining how these new business
courts will operate, one can determine if the new methods will produce
benefits comparable to those provided by the Delaware court system.
23. Id.
24. See Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 17 (describing both the evolution of the Delaware
Court of Chancery into the preeminent corporate forum and its influence on the law throughout
America's history).
25. See Dreyfuss, supranote 14, at 25.
26. See id.
27. See id.; see also Section VII.A.2.
28. See Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1954-55 (1998).
29. Id.
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III. ACTIVELY PURSUING BUSINESS: THE ARGUMENT FOR BUSINESS
COURTS AND THEIR PROLIFERATION

A. The Increase in the Specialization of Law
As Adam Smith predicted, specialization has become a part of
professional life in America. 30 In modern society it is difficult to
describe a person's career adequately using a general label such as
"doctor," "banker," or "teacher." A quick look at the American Bar
Association's ("ABA") organizational chart reflects increased
specialization in the legal profession as well. 31 The ABA has twentyeight sections, the business law section has eighty committees, and
the banking law committee provides further division into thirteen
substantive subcommittees. 32 Although lawyers are becoming more
specialized, the majority of judges remain generalists. 33 Proponents of
specialization have begun to argue that generalist judges lead to
greater costs for litigants because of the increased time required to
that
educate generalist judges in each case. These proponents predict
34
long.
so
for
expense
that
bear
to
litigants will only be willing
Business has become more specialized and faster paced as well,
and that change has created an increasingly complex legal
environment. 35 Professors Chris Carr and Michael Jencks identify
several factors leading to this change. 36 First, they point to an
increasing number of businesses that work in several locations around
the country, thus creating forum, choice-of-law, judgment

30. See Richard A. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeal Survive until 1984? An Essay
on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761, 776 (1983)
(discussing Adam Smith's prediction and endorsement of using specialization to get more out of
society's resources).
31. R. Franklin Balotti & Roland E. Brandel, Business Bench: Are Special Courts the
Future?,Bus. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb., 1995, at 25.
32. Id.
33. See Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, supra note 18, at 948. This comparison is
not to say that the judiciary is entirely generalist. See 17 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4107 (3d ed. 2000). Several specialized courts exist in the
federal court system, including the Federal Claims Court, the Court of International Trade, the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, tax courts,
and bankruptcy courts. Id.
34. See Michael Asimow, Toward a New California Administrative Procedure Act:
Adjudicatory Fundamentals, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1067, 1185 (noting the higher costs of generalist
judges in an administrative law setting); Edward V. DeLillo, Note, Fighting Fire with
Firefighters:A Proposal For Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 482 (1993)
(discussing the high cost of educating generalist judges on technical matters).
35. See Chris A. Carr & Michael R. Jencks, The Privatizationof Business and Commercial
Dispute Resolution:A Misguided Policy Decision, 88 KY. L.J. 183, 194 (1999-2000).
36. See id. at 194-97.
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enforcement, and discovery problems. 37 Second, Carr and Jencks note
the proliferation of secondary rights, such as contract rights, patent
law rights, and rights under unfair competition law. 38 Third, the
authors point to the increased speed of business, specifically stating
that high-technology markets often change several times over by the
time litigation is resolved. 39 Finally, Carr and Jencks highlight
business's dissatisfaction with the new law merchant, the entity that
provides decisions in a previously unfamiliar area of law-in other
words, the entity parties go to to develop law and norms to govern a
new industry. 40 In a sense, businesses are so new, and changing so
fast, that there are no satisfactory established norms. Therefore,
companies in emerging markets must turn to the courts for dispute
resolution more often than established markets. 41 In turn, the courts
must adapt quickly to fill gaps in the existing law, or the parties will
turn to alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") as a means of solving
42
their problems quickly.
Changes in business speed and specialization might not cause
concern in state legislatures were it not for the litigation backlog. 43 In
fact, ninety-four percent of business executives and eighty-two percent
of in-house counsel surveyed in 1997 indicated that they believe there
has been a litigation explosion in the last ten years. 44 Further, eightysix percent of business executives and seventy-nine percent of inhouse counsel feel that less than half of lawsuits involving businesses
are resolved within an appropriate amount of time. 45 The issues in
business litigation not only require rapid resolution, but they also are
complex and may divert judicial resources from other parts of the
justice system. 46 Thus, business litigation results in a disproportionate

37.
38.
39.

Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 197.

40.

Id. at 198.

41. See id. at 197-98. For example, see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in
Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL. L. REV. 349 (1993) (noting that electronic networks is
an area of high-technology law that struggled with generating norms and effective legal
precedent).
42. See Carr & Jencks, supra note 35, at 197-98.
43. See Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil
Litigation, 85 CAL. L. REV. 225-26 (1997) (commenting that the delay in civil litigation has
become intolerable).
44. John Lande, FailingFaith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers' and Executive's
Opinions, 3 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998).
45. Id. at 36.
46. See Diane P. Wood, Law, Truth, and Interpretation:A Symposium on Dennis Patterson's
Law and Truth Speech: Generalized Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REV. 1755, 1764
(1997).
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use of judicial resources by demanding fast litigation, while at the
same time producing the most time-consuming cases.4 7 Therefore,
specialized treatment of business cases may reduce the backlog in all
areas of the law and benefit other types of litigants. After considering
these facts, it is not surprising that states have advanced business
court proposals to deal with the perceived and actual need for
48
increased speed and specialization in the court system.
B. Dealing with the Need for Speed and Specialization:Specialized
Business Courts and the Rocket Docket
In response to the changing business world, increased
specialization, dissatisfaction with the court system, the litigation
explosion, and the subsequent litigation backlog, a number of states
49
have enacted or proposed the creation of specialized business courts.
At the same time, the federal courts have begun creating "rocket
dockets" to deal with the civil litigation delay. 50 The basic structure of
a rocket docket is simple. In order to implement a rocket docket, a
court makes a firm commitment early in the discovery and pretrial
process to establish firm dates for all pretrial proceedings. 5 1 The
development of rocket dockets in the federal courts responds to an
admonition from Congress, 52 but courts, rather than the legislature,
53
generally implement their key components through local court rules.
This Note will discuss two courts, the North Carolina Business Court
and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, as predecessors to the high-tech attempts made in Michigan
and Maryland to demonstrate how these states combine specialized
business courts, rocket dockets, and technology to improve the
adjudication of high-technology business disputes and thereby to
attract business to their respective states.

47. See id.
48. See generally Johnson, supra note 43, at 226.
49. Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, supra note 18, at 955-59 (providing an overview
of specialized business courts in Delaware, New Jersey, Illinois, New York, North Carolina,
Wisconsin, and Virginia, as well as proposed business courts in Pennsylvania, California,
Florida, and Massachusetts). This Note will provide a description of the North Carolina Court of
Business as a subject for comparison to the Michigan and Maryland approaches.
50. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 225.
51. Id. at 233.
52. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (2000) (establishing a requirement that federal courts develop
and implement a delay reduction plan designed to improve their efficiency).
53. Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civil
Justice Reform, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 799, 803-04 (1998).
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1. Specialization: The North Carolina Business Court
North Carolina established its business court in January of
1996 when Governor Hunt appointed Ben F. Tennille as North
Carolina's first Special Superior Court Judge for Complex Business
Cases. 54 North Carolina worked within its existing court system by
amending Rule 2.1 and adopting Rule 2.2 of the General Rules of
Practice for the Superior and District Courts to change the way in
which North Carolina handles complex business cases. 55 The new
Rules 2.1 and 2.2 allow the chief justice, upon motion of the court or
the parties, to designate certain controversies as "complex business
56
cases" and refer them to the North Carolina Business Court.
North Carolina uses a flexible definition of complex business
cases. 57 Instead of adopting a rigid framework, North Carolina's
legislature and supreme court contemplated cases involving several of
the state's business-oriented statutes. 58 The state directed courts to
consider factors including the effect and implications of the litigation
beyond the two parties, the predictability that would result from a
written disposition of the case, court procedural implications such as
time sensitivity, the number of discovery disputes, complexity of legal
and evidentiary issues, and the involvement of multiple parties and
jurisdictions. 59 Once a judge designates the case as a complex business
dispute, it is automatically assigned to a superior court judge
appointed by the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court
60
for adjudication.
After designation, the complex business judge hears the case in
the county where it was filed or in another appropriate venue. 61 The
same judge handles all pretrial motions and discovery, thus increasing
consistency and reducing the possibility of conflicting decisions. 62 A
key provision of the North Carolina Business Court is that, as is the
case in the Delaware Court of Chancery, every case resolved in court

54. Stephen C. Keadey, Into the Danger Zone: Massey v. City of Charlotte and the Fate of
Conditional Zoning in North Carolina, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1155 (2001) (examining a complex
business case heard by the North Carolina Business Court); see also NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS
COURT, HISTORY, available at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/history.htm (last visited Nov. 13,
2002).
55.

N.C. GEN. R. PRAC. R. 2.1-2.2.

56.

See R. 2.1(a), (b).

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

R. 2.1(d).
R. 2.1 cmt.
R. 2.1(d).
R. 2.2.
SeeR. 2.1.
R. 2.1(b).
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must result in a written disposition of the case. 63 North Carolina
reasons that this requirement will enhance predictability and reduce
64
future similar litigation.
The North Carolina Business Court is one of the few courts
that has as one of its goals attracting corporations to the state. 65 It
has, however encountered a considerable number of difficulties in
practice. Professors Kahan and Kamar observe that North Carolina's
court has too broad a jurisdictional grant, jury retention problems,
and unavailability of opinions which are always written but
inexplicably not published in any state or regional reporter. 66 As
discussed below, all of these are potential problems for Michigan's and
Maryland's cyber courts as well.
2. Speed: The Eastern District of Virginia's Rocket Docket
Concerns related to speed and the perceived backlog in the
court system have led to the development of another tool for
accelerating litigation: the rocket docket. 67 A brief look at the Eastern
District of Virginia demonstrates how a successful rocket docket
operates. 68 Heather Russell Koenig, a former clerk for the Eastern
District of Virginia, observes that the first key to the Eastern
District's success is early intervention in, and control over, the
litigation process through the creation and enforcement of a pretrial
calendar. 69 Once the calendar is set, the court will not grant parties'
requests for continuances unless they demonstrate good cause, and
the court will not excuse counsel's failure to proceed promptly with the
normal processes of discovery. 70 Beyond imposing a strict calendar, the
court also hears oral argument on only half of the motions filed. When
the court does hear arguments, it hears them at the earliest possible
opportunity. 7 1 Depositions and discovery are limited to the bare
necessities with an eye toward reducing the number of depositions,
63.

R. 2.1(b); see also NORTH CAROLINA BUSINESS COURT,

BUSINESS COURT OPINIONS

(presenting a list of unofficial, electronically formatted copies of court opinions), available at
http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions (last visited Nov. 17, 2002).
64. See id.
65. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 10, at 56.
66. Id. at 57.
67. This Note will address how Michigan and Maryland are implementing and potentially
improving on the rocket docket concept, infra Part VII.
68. Koenig, supra note 53, at 804.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing E.D. VA. LOC. R. 16(B)).
71. Id. at 805-06. There are some differences between the divisions in the district, but these
variations do not substantially alter the general practice of speedy resolution of motions. See id.
at 806-07.
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interrogatories, and discovery disputes, along with the travel expenses
and time required to take depositions outside of the district. 72 The
Eastern District of Virginia has improved the speed with which it
disposes of cases because of these measures and has become one of the
73
most efficient federal district courts.
IV. TECHNOLOGY IN THE COURTROOM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS

Initially, courts were slow to introduce technology into the
courtroom.7 4 Technology entered the courtroom on an ad hoc basis by
way of case-specific hardware used to present evidence. 75 Today,
courts are becoming more technically proficient, and public demand
has provided even more motivation for courts to become proactive in
implementing technological advancements. 76 In at least one instance,
a court has allowed the use of videoconferencing to substitute for the
plaintiffs appearance in court in a prisoner litigation suit. 77 Courts
have also begun using electronic filing and case management,
increasingly advanced hypertext CD-ROM-based legal briefs, 78
evidentiary
materials, 79
E-mail
service
of process, 80
and
8
1
videoconferencing and videotaped depositions.

72. Id. at 807-09.
73. Id. at 812-14 (discussing data placing the Eastern District of Virginia as one of the
fastest courts in the country).
74. In practice and in legal education, technology has made a larger impact more quickly.
For the effects of technology-enhanced research on the practice of law and legal education, see
Molly Warner Lien, Technocentrism and the Soul of the Common Law Lawyer, 48 AM. U. L. REV.
85 (1998).
75. Fredric I. Lederer, Trial Advocacy: The Road to the Virtual Courtroom?A Consideration
of Today's-and Tomorrow's-High-Technology Courtrooms,50 S.C. L. REV. 799, 801 (1999).
76. See James Crowell, Legal Update: The Electronic Courtroom, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
10 (1997); Lawrence P. Wilkins, The Ability of the Current Legal Framework to Address Advances
in Technology, 33 IND. L. REV. 1 (1999) (observing the increasing role that technology has begun
to play in the current legal system).
77. Edwards v. Logan, 38 F. Supp. 2d 463 (W.D. Va. 1999).
78. For a detailed discussion of CD-ROM technology, CD-ROM legal briefs and their legal
status, see Joanne M. Snow, Comment, CD-ROM Briefs: Must Today's High Tech Lawyers Wait
Until the PlayingField is Level?, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 615 (1999).
79. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for InstitutionalReform and More Judicial Acceptance,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161 (2000) (providing an overview of the increased use of computergenerated evidence in the courtroom and addressing systematic concerns). This Note will not
discuss the use of computer-generated evidence. Instead, this Note will instead focus more
narrowly on the use of technology in the actual conduct of the trial, because the specialized
courts in question increase the use of technology in procedure but not necessarily in
presentation. See infra Part V.
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At the forefront of such technological change stands the
Courtroom 21 project, spearheaded by Fredric I. Lederer and located
at the Marshall-Wythe Law School at the College of William and
Mary, which is aimed at researching and improving courtroom
technology.8 2 Courtroom 21, while not affiliated directly with any
practicing court, is the most advanced courtroom facility in the United
States, and provides a picture of what a technologically advanced
court may look like in the near future.8 3 Along with the capability to
take remote witness testimony, Courtroom 21 is the only courtroom in
the world that contains a multimedia court record system that
simultaneously records audio and video synchronized to a real-time
transcript.8 4 In addition, Courtroom 21 takes remote witness
testimony to a new level through the use of a forty-inch television that
displays an almost life-size image of the witness behind the witness
stand.8 5 On the other end, the witness can see several views of the
86
courtroom and the speaker.
In order to examine how technology, specifically the technology
that Michigan utilizes in its cyber court, has gained acceptance in the
legal system, this Note will explore videoconferencing 7 and its
gradually increasing role and acceptance in the courtroom. Use of
videoconferencing has increased slowly; in fact, before 1965, courts not
only frowned upon the use of a video camera in the courtroom, but also
considered it a violation of due process.88 Today, declining costs and
improvements in technology have prompted states to begin using
videoconferencing for routine matters while evaluating the
possibilities for future expansion.8 9 The Federal Rules of Civil

80. In re Int'l Telemedia Assoc., Inc. v. Diaz, 245 B.R. 713, 719-20 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000)
(allowing E-mail service of process when an individual could not feasibly reach an individual by
other means).
81.

Lederer, supra note 75, at 801, 810.

See COLL. OF WM. & MARY & NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., COURTROOM 21 (containing a
wealth of information about the court and its technological capabilities, as well as news and
updates on new developments in courtroom technology), available at http://www.courtroom21.net
(last visited Feb. 24, 2002).
83. Id.
84. Lederer, supra note 75, at 811.
82.

85.

Id.

86. Id. at 819-20.
87. Videoconferencing is a two-way communication technology that allows parties at
different locations to speak to each other in close to real time. Michael D. Roth, Laissez-Faire
Videoconferencing: Remote Witness Technology and Adversarial Truth, 48 UCLA L. REV. 185,
189 (2000).
88. Michael A. Stodghill, Recent Decisions: The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit,55 MD. L. REV. 921, 1015-16 (1996).

89.

Roth, supra note 87, at 191-92.
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Procedure allow the use of remote witness testimony "for good cause
shown in compelling circumstances
and upon appropriate
safeguards." 90 In Maryland v. Craig, the Supreme Court allowed
remote testimony under the Federal Rules in a child abuse case. The
Court refused to hold that remote witness testimony is
unconstitutional per se, and opened the door for all courts to allow
testimony when individuals were beyond the subpoena power of the
court or unable to travel. 9 1 Further, many states have codified the
Supreme Court's holding and have specifically provided for the use of
videoconferencing and remote witness testimony in child abuse and
92
sexual assault cases.
The growing acceptance of videoconferencing has raised some
questions about its ability to accurately re-create the adversarial
process. One commentator mentions several possible concerns
associated with videoconferencing: telegenic distortions 93, demeanor
testimony, and issues relating to witness credibility. 94 Essentially,
most concerns focus on the fear that litigants will employ technologydriven methods to distort the jurors' perceptions of a witness. 95 Roth
counters this concern by stating that, even today, jurors and judges
sitting as triers of fact do not see a pure representation of a witness
because of the techniques many lawyers use to improve the
appearance of credibility. 96 Roth advocates loose regulation of
videoconferencing technology and accepts it as another tool in the
adversarial process. 9 7 Aside from the comparison to coaching live
witnesses, initial studies conducted as a part of the Courtroom 21
project demonstrate that jurors do not perceive individuals testifying
via videoconferencing as any more or less likely to tell the truth than
98
witnesses testifying in person.
A recent civil commitment hearing before the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals in United States v. Baker 99 demonstrates that courts
have become more accepting of videoconferencing technology in the
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
cases to aid
93. Id.
perceptions
94.

at 193 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 43).
at 193-96; see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
at 194 n.43 (listing state statutes that allow remote witness testimony in child abuse
a child witness testifying about sensitive material).
at 198-99 (citing the 1960 Nixon-Kennedy debate as the classic case where
differed between television viewers and individuals witnessing the event in person).

Id. at 199-204.

95. Id. at 202-04 (describing ways in which a video may be shot in order to influence
perception).
96. Id. 206-07.
97. Id.
98. Lederer, supra note 75, at 820.
99. 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 871 (1995).
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courtroom as well as how they have addressed some of the concerns it
raises. 10 0 In Baker, the court allowed the use of expert testimony via
videoconferencing in a civil commitment hearing, which can closely
resemble a criminal case and which thus implicates substantial due
process concerns. 10 ' Although the court limited its holding to the
special circumstance of a civil commitment where demeanor and
persuasiveness is less important than an expert's qualifications, it
permitted the use of video testimony and held that it did not violate
due process rights even where there was potential for a substantial
10 2
imposition on the individual's liberty.
The rapid development of technology will inevitably change the
way lawyers conduct a trial. In response to the increased use of
videoconferencing, it may not be long before law firms employ makeup
artists and television producers to present themselves more effectively
in front of the jury. In light of the rapid advancement and acceptance
of technology in the courtroom, Lederer may be correct in postulating
that the ultimate question is not "what we can do with the
technological options available to us, but rather for what purposes we
10 3
may wish to use technology?"'
V. COMBINING HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS COURTS: How
MICHIGAN AND MARYLAND LEGISLATURES PROPOSE TO ATTRACT HIGHTECH BUSINESS TO THEIR STATES

As described above, states have begun enacting and creating
courts designed to handle the needs of complex litigation in an
efficient, consistent, and attractive manner. 10 4 Given this drive for
increased specialization and speed, and the increased acceptance of
technology in court proceedings, the time may be right for courts to
combine technology and specialization. Two states, Maryland and
Michigan, are developing courts designed to combine specialization in
business and technology matters by increasing the use of technology
in the courtroom to entice high-tech businesses to relocate or

100. Id.
101. Id. at 842-43. But see United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding
that the use of videoconferencing at a sentencing hearing violated Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure).
102. Id. at 847. But see Stodghill, supra note 88, at 105 (stating that the court's reasoning in
Baker may be problematic because it does not always consider the liberty interest at stake to be
as great as that for criminal imprisonment, but also maintaining that the court's reasoning is
consistent with Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
103. Lederer, supra note 75, at 802-03.
104. See Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, supra note 18.
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reincorporate in their states. 10 5 Generally, the logic is similar to that
supporting general business courts. Businesses in general need fast,
efficient, and predictable courts, but high-tech businesses in particular
require subject-matter specialization and speed because of that
market's specialized legal and technical concerns and its fast evolution
and operation. 106 Therefore, Michigan and Maryland reason, these
businesses may be particularly interested in utilizing specialized
judges and technologically advanced procedural methods to accelerate
litigation. 107
A. The Michigan Approach
In his 2001 State of the State address, Michigan Governor John
Engler outlined a series of initiatives designed to attract inventors,
entrepreneurs, small-tech, and information technology firms to the
state. 108 One of the initiatives was the creation of a connected court
that could satisfy the demands of high-tech business.1 0 9 Engler stated
that such a court would give Michigan the opportunity to be to hightech companies what Delaware is to traditional corporations.1 1 0 The
plan took shape quickly, and by December 13, 2001, the Michigan
House of Representatives passed an amendment to the Revised
Judicature Act of 1961 adding Chapter 80 and establishing the
Michigan Cyber Court."'
The Michigan Cyber Court proposal contains several provisions
directing the court to accommodate out-of-state litigants. First, the
court will "sit in facilities designed to allow all hearings and
proceedings to be conducted by means of electronic communications,
including, but not limited to, video and audio conferencing and
internet conferencing."1 1 2 In fact, the law requires that all matters in
the cyber court be heard via electronic communication and allows the

105. A brief look at the possible substantive concerns of high-tech business follows infra
Section VIIA. This Section only addresses the possible differences in the desired manner of
adjudication.
106. See David Hechler, Bill Would Fast-Track Business Cases, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 17, 2001, at
A15 (Michigan Governor John Engler commented, "You're dealing with entities that move at
warp speed ... And we've got to realize that they can be created and go out of existence in the
time it takes a lawsuit to move through normal channels.")
107. Id.
108. Engler, supra note 11.
109. Id.

110. Id.
111. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262.
112. § 8001(3).
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clerk of the court to issue oaths and affirmations electronically.1 13 This
procedural rule enables the court to reach parties far beyond
Michigan's borders with more ease than traditional courts. In fact, the
statute specifically requires the court to accommodate out-of-state
litigants and to broadcast its proceedings on the Internet. 114 Not only
does this law allow out-of-state litigants to appear more easily, but it
also allows other interested parties in those states to "attend"
hearings in Michigan. 115
The House Bill also directs the Michigan Supreme Court to
assign only those judges who request assignment to the cyber court
and also to consider the applicant's experience in presiding over
commercial litigation and interest in the application of technology to
court proceedings. 116 Further, the statute directs the Michigan
Judicial Institute to provide specific training for judges assigned to the
cyber court. 117 These provisions effectively create expert judges who
will be interested and trained in business law and technology.
The Michigan Legislature also provided the cyber court with
special jurisdictional limits.1 18 Unlike North Carolina's flexible
assignment plan, 119 Michigan limits the court's jurisdiction to
enumerated business disputes where the amount in controversy
exceeds $25,000.120 What distinguishes Michigan from North Carolina,

113. §§ 8015, 8017. Some lawyers, most likely those with offices in Michigan, may be able
and willing to attend a hearing in person. The Michigan court will have to determine if it will
require a party willing to travel to the court's physical facility to use electronic means when the
opposing party is not willing to appear in court in person. A controversy could occur when one
party could easily travel to the court in person, while the other is an out-of-state litigant who
cannot travel without great expense. In order to avoid potential bias, the court should require
that if one party is using electronic communication, the other must do so as well. See In re San
Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 129 F.R.D. 424 (D. P. R., 1990) (establishing procedures for
live remote satellite television testimony).
114. § 8001(4). For concerns related to using the Internet in out-of-state legal representation
see Louise Ellen Teitz, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Cyberspace: The Promise
and Challenge of On-line Dispute Resolution, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 985, 990 (2001) (discussing
the effects of on-line interstate practice on the nature of a law practice and professional
responsibility).
115. § 8001(4).
116. § 8003(1). It is important to note that the term and selection process contains some
state-specific constitutional issues. Those issues are outside the scope of this Note. For
information on similar constitutional and fiscal problems in another state, Pennsylvania, see
Kimberly A. Ward, Note & Comment, Getting Down to Business-PennsylvaniaMust Create a
Business Court, or Face the Consequences, 18 J.L. & COM. 415, 418-20 (1999).
117. § 8003(5).
118. § 8005.
119. N.C. R. GEN. PRAC. 2.1(d) (detailing the factors which may be considered in North
Carolina to determine whether to designate a case, or a group of cases, as "exceptional" or a
business as a "complex business").
120. § 8005(1)-(2).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

578

[Vol. 56:561

and other states, is the legislature's direction that the cyber court hear
disputes involving "Information Technology, Software or Website
Development, Maintenance or Hosting." 12 1 Such a provision broadens
the court's jurisdiction when compared to other business courts and
allows the cyber court to hear matters particular to high-tech
business, even if they might not normally fall within a standard
business court's jurisdiction. The Act loosely defines "business and
commercial actions" to mean disputes between business owners,
associates, competitors, or between a business entity and its
customers. 122 The statute provides several nonexclusive examples,
including internal organization, contractual agreements involving
trade secrets, covenants not to compete, disputes arising out of
commercial transactions including those with banks, business or
commercial insurance, and commercial real property other than
landlord/tenant.123 The law excludes certain disputes including those
involving torts, landlord/tenant relationships, employee/employer
relationships, administrative agencies, criminal matters and
proceedings to enforce judgments. 24 Thus, the Michigan Cyber Court
is not limited to cases that involve corporate law disputes but may
hear a wider variety of claims, so long as they involve high-tech
businesses.
The cyber court law also includes several procedural rules
designed to address potential due process concerns. First, the cyber
court is a voluntary forum. Defendants may remove the action to an
appropriate, so long as they do so within fourteen days after the
deadline for filing an answer.1 25 Second, unless one of the parties
removes within that time, the court will assume that both parties
have waived their right to a trial by jury. 26 As a result, judges conduct
trials without a jury, which are normally subject to a new trial under
127
the same standards applicable in other Michigan courts.
While the cyber court statute certainly differs from proposals in
other states, the real difference in the Michigan approach stems from
an addition to the Michigan Court Rules: Chapter 2A Electronic
Practice. 128 The draft rules emphasize and promote the use of the

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

§ 8005(2)(A).
§ 8005(2).
§ 8005(2)(B)-(F).
§ 8005(3)(A)-(F).
§ 8011(1).
§ 8013.
§ 8019.

128. STATE BAR OF MICHIGAN CYBER COURT RULES WORKGROUP, MICHIGAN COURT RULES:
SPECIAL RULES FOR ELECTRONIC PRACTICE IN CYBER COURT (Sept. 10, 2001), available at
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Internet and electronic forms for a variety of court procedures. The
rules provide for the electronic filing of certified copies, sworn
statements, 129 motions, 130 depositions, 13' electronic appearance of
33 and service via E-mail. 34
witnesses, 132 electronic proof of service,
Collectively, these rules create one of the most far-reaching
implementations of required electronic procedure in the courts.
To ensure that the parties will be qualified to use all of these
procedures, the court rules call for parties to be authorized as
electronic filers. 35 The rules require these filers to sign an agreement
complying with all of the court's electronic security measures,
maintain a current E-mail address of record, pay any applicable fee,
and remain in good standing as an authorized filer. 136 Further, the
37
court places the risk of any difficulties in transmission on the filer.
Michigan justifies these requirements by stating that because the
cyber court is a voluntary forum, it is acceptable to place minimal
38
conditions on litigants to ensure the court's integrity.
Finally, the court rules create a cyber court website designed to
be the "front door" of the cyber courtroom. 39 The cyber court website
will contain all the relevant contact and jurisdictional information, as
well as the electronic filer agreement, the docket information,
information on accessing documents filed in the cyber court, a menu of
ADR techniques, and technical filing information. 40 As part and
parcel of the menu of ADR options, the cyber court draft rules contain
a provision making the court and its facilities useful as quickly as

http://www.michbar.org/framemaker.cfm?content-dir=news/releases&content=cybercourt.html
(last visited Jan. 23, 2003).
129. R. 2.001D (stating that the original must be provided upon request).
130. R. 2.001F.
131. R. 2.001G.
132. R. 2.OOOE (allowing a party or witness may appear using two-way interactive video
technology, videoconference technology, or Internet broadcast technology).
133. R. 2.001H (requiring that proof of service be sent to recipient's registered E-mail
address or by facsimile, with acknowledgement).
134. R. 2.0011.
135. R. 2.102A.
136. R. 2.102A.
137. R. 2.102A(C).
138. R. 2.102A, workgroup cmt.
139. R. 2.105A, workgroup cmt.
Court, see
the
Cyber
information
regarding
For current
140. R.
2.015A.
http://www.michigancybercourt.net (last visited Feb. 26, 2002).
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possible to settle disputes through ADR. 141 These provisions make the
142
cyber court an environment ripe for creative dispute resolution.
B. The Maryland Approach
The Maryland legislature created a special task force to
recommend court reform aimed at attracting high-tech business to
Maryland. 143 The Act reflected the Maryland legislature's intent to
treat business and technology matters effectively and efficiently in the
judicial system, through recommendations generated by discussions
between the state's business and legal communities. 144 The Maryland
Business and Technology Task Force ("Task Force") set forth a
proposal for reform in the Maryland Business and Technology Court
Task Force Report ("Maryland Task Force Report"). 145
Maryland's approach differs from that of Michigan in two ways.
First, instead of creating an entirely new court, the Task Force
recommended
a statewide Business
and Technology Case
Management Program within Maryland's existing Differentiated Case
Management ("DCM") system.' 46 By using the existing framework,
Maryland follows North Carolina's lead and takes a more cautious
approach than Michigan.' 47 Second, Maryland does not advocate or
require as much use of technology and does not provide for courts to
conduct hearings and proceedings via video or audio conferencing or to
broadcast them over the Internet. 148 Like that in Michigan, the
Maryland approach advocates a loose definition of the types of cases
courts should refer to the management track and allows parties to opt
out of the program if they so choose. 149 As is the case with most
Business Courts, Maryland proposes to limit jurisdiction to disputes
with more than $50,000 in controversy and to issues of a complex
nature where specialized treatment is likely to improve the
expectation of a fair trial.1 50 In addition, Maryland includes disputes
arising out of technology development, maintenance and consulting
141. R. 2.106A. For a general examination of on-line dispute resolution, see generally Teitz,
supra note 114.
142. R. 2.106A, workgroup cmt.
143. 2000 Md. Laws 10 (referring to Bill 15).
144. Id.
145. MARYLAND
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COURT TASK FORCE

http://www.courts.state.md. us/finalb&treport.pdf.
146. Id. at 7.
147. Rivkin, supra note 8.
148. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 8001(4).
149. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 8.

150. Id.

(2000), available at
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agreements, and network and Internet website development. 151 Again,
such provisions enlarge the traditional business court jurisdiction to
include a higher percentage of technology cases. 15 2 As is the case in
North Carolina, the Maryland Task Force takes a flexible
jurisdictional approach and provides presumptively included cases
153
instead of drawing bright lines.
By using the existing court system, Maryland gives litigants
more choice. When there are disputes, the court will assign an
administrative judge to determine whether the case is properly
assigned to the program.1 54 Litigants can also choose between two
tracks within the program. One track is established for cases where
discovery is limited and the court sets a trial date within ninety days
of filing an answer.' 55 Another standard track exists for cases
requiring complicated discovery where the trial date is set within nine
months of filing.156 The same judge handles all of the filings, including
discovery motions. 57 Publication rules remain the same as for all of
the other Maryland courts, with a special admonition for the judges to
58
confer to ensure consistent opinions.
Finally, the task force addressed ADR and determined that
Maryland's current DCM system already encouraged several types of
ADR. 159 Similar to the Michigan approach, the Maryland Task Force
provides that judges should recommend ADR for all cases coming
through the business and technology track. 160 Maryland goes further
than Michigan, however, by proposing the creation of a special
training program for mediators working on cases within the track's
16 1
jurisdiction.
Much like Michigan, Maryland provides for E-filing and the
electronic exchange of court documents. 162 As with the rest of the
program, this provision grows out of the Maryland court system's

151. Id. at 8-10.

152. Id. How the word "technology" broadens the definition of business cases remains to be
seen, but ostensibly, "technology" could add any case involving technology companies or a large
amount of highly technical evidence to the court's jurisdiction.
153. Id. at 9-10.
154. Id. at 11.

155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.

158. Id. at 11-12.
159. Id. at 14.
160. Id.
161. Id.

162. Id. at 15.
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existing practices. 163 Further, the commission also recommends the
use of on-line repositories of evidentiary materials, multimedia briefs,
double-blind bidding software for settlements, and the use of Internet
and videoconferencing. 164 Essentially, Maryland has integrated many
of the same components as Michigan. However, the Maryland
approach fits within a more familiar background, because it merely
adds another existing track to the current court system.
VI. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: WHY DELAWARE?

An analytic framework is necessary in order to evaluate the
potential success of the Michigan Cyber Court and the Maryland Task
Force proposal in attracting high-technology businesses to their
respective states. As stated above, it is no secret that Delaware's
corporate law is the envy of most states. 165 Therefore, an overview and
analysis of some competing theories that attempt to explain
Delaware's success and to identify the benefits that businesses derive
from Delaware courts will provide a useful method for determining
whether or not these new business law courts can replicate the
166
Delaware model.
One could argue, however, that despite its dominance in the
race for corporate charters, Delaware is not an appropriate basis for
comparison. One reason may be that the goals Michigan and
Maryland seek to achieve may be different from those already
accomplished in Delaware. 16 7 Michigan and Maryland have chosen not
to compete with Delaware across the board but have specifically
tailored their new specialty courts to attract high-tech businesses. 168
Further, Michigan and Maryland may not be competing for corporate
charters, but instead may be more interested in attracting businesses
to locate their operations in their states, thereby creating jobs for their

163. The Baltimore County courts have had considerable experience in using E-filing to
manage over ten thousand asbestos cases. Id. at 16.
164. Id. at 17 n.8.
165. See Engler, supra note 11.
166. This Note, however, will not cover competition through revision of substantive corporate
law. Some states, including Nevada and Texas, have adopted this approach. For a more detailed
analysis of statutory considerations pertaining to the choice of a state of incorporation, see
generally David Mace Roberts & Rob Pivnick, Tale of the Corporate Tape: Delaware, Nevada and
Texas, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 45 (2000). The states examined in this Note have chosen to keep their
existing corporate codes intact and instead effect the process through judicial matters. Such a
change may have just as much of an impact on the choice of a state of incorporation as states
with altered corporations codes.
167. See Engler, supra note 11.
168. Id.
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residents. 169 This Note will address this concern in two ways. First, in
Part VII, this Note pays special attention to how high-tech business
needs may be different with regard to general access to the courts.
Second, in Part VIII, this Note will posit that location may be more
important to Michigan and Maryland than incorporation. This Note
also will explore some substantive corporate, employment, and trade
secret law differences that high-tech firms may desire and
demonstrate how Michigan and Maryland may attract businesses to
170
locate, and potentially incorporate, in their states.
A second problem is that the general measure of Delaware's
success-the large number of companies that have incorporated 17' and
filed their corporate charters in Delaware-may not be attributable to
the nature of the Delaware judiciary or judicial system. 172 Jeffery
Stempel argues that the incorporation decision may have less to do
with the choice of law, or judicial efficiency, than "tax rates, the degree
of regulator scrutiny, inertia or other favorable factors only loosely
related to the state's judicial structure."1 73 Furthermore, Professors
Marcel Kahan and Ehud Kamar contend that Michigan and
Maryland, like all other states in the corporate charter race, decline to
174
compete with Delaware with regard to judge-made law.
This Note addresses these concerns in the following two ways.
First, it acknowledges that substantive corporate law factors may be
important but avoids a substantive analysis of corporate law statutes
under the assumption that many statutory differences-interpretation
notwithstanding-could be remedied by a legislature willing to adopt
the Delaware Corporate Code in toto. Second, this Note recognizes
that a by-product of specialization may be increased understanding
and consideration of issues important to high-tech businesses and
consistency. Further, in Part VIII, this Note examines certain areas of
169. See, Kahan & Kamar, supra note 10 (suggesting that competition for corporate charters
is a myth).
170. See discussion infra Section VII.A.
171. Incorporation in Delaware is not limited to businesses located within the state. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 101(a) (2000) ("Any person, partnership association or corporation... without
regard to such person's or entity's residence, domicile or State of Incorporation, may incorporate
or organize a corporation under this chapter.") It is apparent that incorporation is important to
Michigan and Maryland. The only way that corporations will use improved judicial procedures is
if they incorporate in the forum state. For an explication of choice-of-law issues and the internal
affairs doctrine, see Rogers v. Guarantee Trust Co. of N.Y., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933), and Draper
v. Gardner Defined Plan Trust et al., 625 A.2d 859 (Del. 1993). Therefore, Michigan and
Maryland must want to encourage incorporation behavior, because if they did not, there would
be no discernable reason to create a more efficient judiciary.
172. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67, 73-74 (1995).
173. Id. at 74.

174. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 10, at 46.
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substantive law that may be particularly important to high-tech
corporations.
VII. MEETING DELAWARE'S CHALLENGE: How Do MICHIGAN AND
MARYLAND COMPARE TO THE PERCEIVED BENEFITS OF INCORPORATING
IN DELAWARE?
Putting aside for a moment the hypothesis that Michigan and
Maryland are more interested in location than incorporation, this
Note first addresses how successful their proposals will be in each of
their quests to become the Delaware of high-technology business. 175
Legal scholarship has not produced a clear answer as to why Delaware
is so successful in the race for corporate charters. 176 One commentator,
Rochelle Dreyfuss, provides a workable framework for analyzing
specialized courts in general and the Delaware Court of Chancery in
particular. 17 7 This framework provides a model for comparing the
Michigan and Maryland approaches to Delaware. Dreyfuss's
framework, however, requires some tweaking in response to
Michigan's and Maryland's specialized aim. After exploring Dreyfuss's
basic framework, this Note will address specific high-technology
concerns to predict how Michigan and Maryland will fare with respect
to the especially fast-paced and new world of high-technology
178
business.
Dreyfuss considers three general factors for determining the
effectiveness of specialized adjudication: the quality of decisionmaking, efficiency, and the appearance of due process. 179 In order to
evaluate the quality of decisionmaking, Dreyfuss argues that one
should examine three interrelated concepts: accuracy, precision, and
coherence.1 8 0 Dreyfuss defines accuracy as the extent to which the law
produces the correct result; precision as the reproducibility of that
result; and coherence as assuring continuity with current law. 8 1
Efficiency relates to the court's ability to decide its cases within the
time limits that its litigants require.1 8 2 The appearance of due process
includes compliance with traditional due process concerns such as

175. Engler, supra note 11.
176. Romano, supra note 6, at 709 (noting Delaware's preeminence in the market for
corporate charters).
177. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 11.
178. See discussion infra Part VIII.
179. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 11.
180. Id. at 12.
181. Id. at 12-13.
182. Id. at 14.
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notice, a meaningful opportunity for a hearing, compulsory process,
and a neutral adjudicator.183
A. Quality of Decisionmaking
1. The Danger of "Overspecialization"
Dreyfuss notes that specialized courts usually do quite well
with regard to the quality of decisionmaking, due to expertise in their
subject area and their ability to attract high-profile judges, but adds
one caveat:1 8 4 If specialized courts are isolated in their thinking, the
lack of exchange with other courts may affect the quality of
decisionmaking.' 8 5 Dreyfuss argues that Delaware has avoided the
overspecialization problem through flexible application of its laws to
new situations, the skilled nature of practitioners in front of the
Delaware courts, the wide variety of academic literature available,
and the Delaware judges' willingness to use that literature as a part of
18 6
their decisionmaking process.
Along with a potentially narrow view of the law, specialization
may lead to increased industry capture of judges.18 7 Specialization also
creates a smaller battlefield for debating issues and increases the
possibility of one academic ideology or political party taking hold,
which results in more drastic swings in the law and destroys the
consistency expected from a specialized judiciary.18 8 In addition, from
a pragmatic standpoint, specialized judges could become more
expensive over time, as they are more prone to underutilization when
the caseload shifts from one area of the law to another.'8 9 Therefore,
one could reason that the tax base would become more important, and
the satisfaction of taxpaying businesses and legislators might be of
paramount importance for specialized judges. As a result, specialized
183. Id. at 15-16.
184. Id. at 16-17.

185. Id. at 17.
186. Id. at 18. Dreyfuss compares the New York Court of Appeal's opinion in Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619 (N.Y. 1979), with Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980),
rev'd in part, Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1980), and observes that while both
cases use the business judgment rule to invalidate an special litigation committee's decision,
"New York uses the rule as a blunt instrument ....
In contrast, Delaware has developed a test
aimed at distinguishing disabling conflicts of interest from the conflict inherent in every
situation in which derivate suits are dismissed." Id.
187. Posner, supra note 30, at 783. Posner also argues that political influence is only
detrimental if society wishes to limit the influence of special interest groups. Id. at 784.
188. Id. at 781.
189. See id. at 788-89 (discussing criticisms that the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals have not had enough work to do).
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judges might be inclined to render decisions favorable to these
constituencies.
Specialization of function is not the only means of increasing
the quality of decisionmaking. Judge John J. Gibbons states that
quality of decisionmaking does not necessarily derive from
specialization, but instead from the judicial selection process. 190 On
this point, Gibbons observes that Delaware's success relates to the fact
that its judges are appointed, not elected, and therefore are not as
likely to succumb to political pressure in their decisionmaking. 19'
Furthermore, Delaware considers politics in their selection process,
and Delaware requires that the governor to balance judicial
192
appointments between the two political parties.
Judge Gibbons seems to recommend judicial selection based
upon merit, 193 but merit selection has its own problems. Some
commentators postulate that merit-based selection processes move
politics out of the public eye and into the back room.1 94 Professor Peter
Webster observes that
while judicial elections are becoming increasingly politicized, the evidence indicates that
appointments are most often based principally upon political considerations, rather than
qualifications. Clearly, the appointive method does nothing to lessen the effect of
partisan politics upon the selection of judges. On the contrary, it would appear that, at
the very least, there is significant potential for partisan politics to play the
determinative role in the selection of judges in states using an appointive method.195

Studies comparing state court judges, who are usually elected,
with federal court judges, who are appointed with life tenure in
accordance with Article III of the United States Constitution, have
also generated conflicting results regarding the effect of majoritarian
pressures on judicial outcomes. 96 Even if there is some difference
between elected and appointed courts, one could hypothesize some

190. John J. Gibbons, The Quality of the Judges Is What Counts in the End, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 45, 47 (1995).
191. Id. The United States Constitution represents this same choice in giving the President
the power to appoint judges, subject to the consent of the Senate, and provides that those judges
"shall hold their Offices during good Behavior." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
192. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
193. Gibbons, supra note 190, at 48-49.
194. See, e.g., Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justices in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Back
Room?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197 (2000). For an answer specific to Michigan's decision to
implement an elected judiciary, see Kurt M. Brauer, The Role of Campaign Fundraising in
Michigan's Supreme Court Elections: Should We Throw the Baby out with the Bathwater?, 44
WAYNE L. REV. 367 (1998).
195. Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention of Judges: Is there One "Best" Method?, 23
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995).
196. MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES, COMMENTS, AND

QUESTIONS 274 (5th ed. 2002) (collecting sources).
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benefits to elected courts that may be particularly important in the
business law area-namely accountability to the public-that mitigate
any perceived deficiencies. The debate continues without any clear
answer as to exactly what effect election, as opposed to appointment,
has on the quality of decisionmaking or on the potential for capture. It
is difficult to rest any criticisms of business courts merely on the effect
of selection because the scholarship-which is beyond the scope of this
Note-provides no empirical answers.
Generalist appellate judges may prove useful in eliminating
the problems associated with overspecialization. There are many
hypothesized advantages associated with generalist judges. Such
judges require lawyers to frame issues in less technical language and
in doing so force "the bar to demystify legal doctrine to make the law
comprehensible." 197 Generalists deal with a wide variety of legal issues
and doctrines, and their experience with myriad legal problems
presumably will lead to better cross-fertilization of ideas. 198 By virtue
of cross-fertilization, generalists create consistent rules and standards
across various areas of the law. 199 Generalist appellate judges may be
able to counter the effects of overspecialization by injecting the law
with the advantages of their broader perspective.
Some commentators argue, however, that generalist review of
specialized court rulings is a mixed blessing. 20 0 Intense review of
specialized court rulings may remove all of the stated benefits of
specialization, including the predictability and stability that
specialization purports to provide. 201 In the end, no bright-line rule
seems sound. Instead, reviewing courts must take special care to
balance the need for imposing generalist viewpoints on specialized
courts in order to maintain the benefits of specialization for
20 2
litigants.
197. Wood, supra note 46, at 1767.
198. Id. But see Posner, supra note 30, at 787 (arguing that specialization reduces crosspollination).
199. Wood, supra note 46, at 1767-68 (using due process as a paradigmatic example).
200. Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109,
128, 130 (1997) (stating that a specialized bankruptcy appeals panel would be desirable and
superior to nonexpert federal district courts).
201. Id. at 124-30 (discussing the potentially harmful effects of generalist review of
bankruptcy decisions).
202. One could draw an analogy to administrative agencies and judicial review of their
decisions because of the analogous expertise, consistency, and capture concerns. There is a
wealth of literature on the subject, and this Note does not seek to recount the various viewpoints
of how much review of agency action is appropriate. Furthermore, there are of course some
different considerations when dealing with a court as opposed to an agency, and the comparison
may only prove useful as a source of guidance in relatively uncharted territory. For the opposing
opinions of two Supreme Court Justices on the subject, writing outside the confines of the
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The most daunting task for courts competing with Delaware is
meeting the challenge of Delaware's high quality of decisionmaking
while avoiding the dangers of overspecialization. Michigan and
Maryland both follow the general premise that specialized judges will
produce a higher quality of decisionmaking by creating more accurate,
precise, and coherent results. 2 3 Notwithstanding the general
arguments that specialized jurists will create bias, 20 4 Michigan and
Maryland
will
both
have
difficulty
answering
Dreyfuss's
admonishment that specialized judges need to remain attuned to the
20 5
world beyond their specialty.
One potential problem with Michigan's and Maryland's
approaches to creating specialized high-tech business courts may be
that the court will be even more specialized than other business courts
and therefore particularly prone to problems that may develop from
specialized jurisprudence. Michigan gives its cyber court jurisdiction
over business and commercial actions and places specific emphasis on
cases involving technology. 206 Unlike the Delaware Chancery Court,
which hears some nonbusiness cases, there is no provision that allows
the judges in either the Michigan or Maryland system to hear cases
outside of their area of specialization. 20 7 Furthermore, Delaware law is
accompanied by a great deal of legal scholarship that is not present in
many other states, including Michigan and Maryland. Therefore, a
greater-than-normal danger exists that the cyber court in Michigan or
the business and technology track in Maryland, will become too
insulated from the general legal debate.
The specialization problems are, in some sense, unavoidable,
but Michigan and Maryland can certainly decrease their effect in two
ways. First, they may do so through careful generalist appellate
review. In order to counter the Delaware Court of Chancery's
specialization by circumstance, Michigan and Maryland must be
proactive in creating a narrower jurisdiction. 20 8 Ultimately, however,
as in Delaware, the generalist appellate courts hold considerable
courtroom, see Justice Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511 (1989) and Justice Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363 (1986).
203. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, §§ 8003(1), 8005.
204. See Romano, supra note 6, at 170-73 (highlighting the classic Cary-Winter debate in
corporate law over the extreme uncertainty regarding what effect state competition would have
on substantive law).
205. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 17.
206. § 8005(1).
207. See DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10; DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1983); Monroe Park v.

Metro. Life Ins., 457 A.2d 734 (Del. 1983).
208. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 9.
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review power over the cyber court. 20 9 Therefore, the intermediate
appellate courts and the Michigan Supreme Court, and likewise the
Maryland Court of Appeals, must retain an active role in corporate
litigation and be willing to intervene and overrule the cyber court or
business and technology track judges if they fail to produce good
decisions. 210 Further, the cyber court or business and technology track
judges must respect and follow higher court precedent. 2 1 Michigan's
and Maryland's appellate courts must not fall into a trap of relying too
heavily on the decisions of the specialized courts merely because they
are specialized. 212 Michigan and Maryland have not addressed
concerns of generalist review ameliorating the benefits of
specialization, and neither state has a supreme court or intermediate
appellate court, with the same amount of experience as those in
Delaware. 21 3 In essence, Michigan and Maryland must rely upon their
appellate judges to review cases in a way that satisfies the delicate
balance between assimilating a generalist viewpoint and retaining the
benefits of specialization.
Second, Michigan and Maryland can counter the effect of
overspecialization by insulating specialized judges from the political
process. 21 4 As previously described, the Michigan Cyber Court law
specifies that the supreme court choose judges for the cyber court from
those who have been elected 215 in the state and have asked the
21 6
supreme court to consider them for service on the cyber court.
Maryland's Court of Appeals judges are nominated by the governor
and confirmed by the senate, but other judges in Maryland must be
209. 2001 Mich. Pub. Act 262, § 8021 (authorizing appeal to the court of appeals under
Michigan Supreme Court Rules).
210. Steve R. Johnson, The Phoenix and the Perils of Second Best: Why HeightenedAppellate
Deference to Tax Court Decisions is Undesirable, 77 OR. L. REV. 235, 285 (1998) (concluding that
a rule requiring increased deference to tax courts would be worse than no reform at all).
211. Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46
STAN. L. REV. 812, 872 (1994) (examining the benefits and arguing for the importance of lower
courts holding true to higher court precedent).
212. Johnson, supranote 210, at 285 (1998).
213. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 28-29 (noting that because Delaware is so small, corporate
cases make up a large amount of the Delaware Supreme Court's docket as well, and because of
this the Delaware Supreme Court has more expertise in the corporate law area than many
generalist supreme courts); see also DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-

2001 ch. 5 (Justice Randy J. Holland & Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001) (addressing the Delaware
Supreme Court's influence on corporate law).
214. See Gibbons, supra note 190, at 48-49. Maryland may have similar issues because it
assigns judges to the business and technology track. Maryland Business and Technology Task
Force Report, supra note 145, at 7.
215. MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 2 (stating that justices are elected to the Michigan Supreme
Court); art. 6, § 12 (providing that circuit court judges also elected).
216. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 8003.
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elected. Both the judges sitting on the Maryland technology track and
those on the Michigan Cyber Court were previously elected then
appointed to a special track. 217 In making the final determination, the
legislature calls on the supreme court to assess the person's
experience and interest in the application of technology in the
courtroom. 218 In one sense, this method of selection does not remove
the judges from the political process because the supreme court selects
judges from a pool of elected judges. On the other hand, because the
supreme court selects the cyber court judges, and because no judge is
elected directly to the cyber court, the supreme court has a
responsibility to ensure that judges appointed to the cyber court
demonstrate legal ability in the corporate law area. By giving the
supreme court discretion in appointing those judges, if it takes a
nonpartisan approach, the Michigan Supreme Court can assure that it
satisfies Judge Gibbon's goal by placing talented and nonpartisan
219
corporate judges on the bench.
Michigan's proposal does not create any further insulation of
the political process, because the supreme court still must select the
cyber court's members, and therefore these judges will be wed not only
to the electorate, but also to the supreme court. The supreme court
exercises control over all judges in the Michigan court system, and
additionally, if the court does not approve of the cyber court rulings, it
is free to reverse them. 220 Ultimately, the decision to elect judges is a
basic policy decision for each state, but in the cases of specialized
business and technology courts, the Michigan Supreme Court and the
Maryland Court of Appeals have an opportunity to insulate the
specialized courts from political influence and to reduce the potential
problems associated with overspecialization. However, if businesses or
the public are not confident that the supreme court will temper the
political nature of the process, the state could, as in Delaware, provide
that appointments to the cyber court must be balanced between the
prevailing political parties.

217. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 7. For a brief overview of Maryland
court structure, see U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 25 (1998) [hereinafter
STATE COURT ORGANIZATION], available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/sco9808.pdf (last

visited Jan. 23, 2003).
218. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 7.

219. See also Maute, supra note 194, at 1243-44 (advocating an objective screening process
for judicial candidates).
220. § 8021 (providing that appeal from the cyber court goes to the Michigan Court of
Appeals).
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2. The Value of Precedent

Beyond specialization and the selection of judges, another
important factor affecting the quality of decisionmaking is the
22 1
existence of a well-developed and predictable body of case law.
Several commentators have noted that Delaware's rich body of case
law provides a wealth of precedent upon which firms and lawyers can
rely. 222 It is this settled precedent, or alternatively, as discussed
below, the way that the Delaware judiciary deals with the
indeterminate precedent, that is the most difficult aspect of
Delaware's model for another state to follow. Ostensibly, predictable
case law and well-developed legal rules reduce the transaction costs of
litigation by decreasing the time spent researching the law and the
volume of litigation, because parties are operating under a system of
well-developed and settled rules. 223 Some commentators argue that if
this predictability holds, and is an essential ingredient to Delaware's
success in the world for corporate charters, then no state will be
successful in emulating the Delaware model without producing a large
224
number of consistent opinions.
The public perception of stability in Delaware may be
somewhat misguided. Commentators dispute the contention that
Delaware corporate law is settled and predictable. 225 Professor Ehud
Kamar argues that not only is Delaware law indeterminate, but that
this indeterminacy prohibits other states from easily adopting and
following Delaware precedent because the indeterminacy places a
great deal of responsibility on the shoulders of Delaware's experienced
corporate judiciary. 226 Kamar goes even further to state that
Delaware's changing corporate law functions as a method of price
discrimination, making it costly or extremely difficult for other states
to adopt its corporate law principles and pull themselves up to
22 7
Delaware's level in terms of consistency and settled precedent.

221. See Alva, supra note 14, at 902-03.
222. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461,
1508 (1989); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the IncorporationPuzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 225, 227 (1985); see also Dreyfuss supra note 14, at 25-26; Fisch, supra note 7, at
1070-71.
223. Fisch, supra note 7, at 1070-71.
224. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 28-29.
225. Fisch, supranote 7, at 1071.
226. Kamar, supra note 28, at 1933 (1998). Kamar also points out that increased reliance on
the Delaware judiciary makes the Delaware model even harder to transport to another state. Id.
227. Id. at 1954 (noting that such discrimination is not necessarily conscious). See also
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 10.
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Several commentators concede that Delaware corporate law
and jurisprudence are indeterminate but also argue that corporate law
benefits from some degree of indeterminacy. 228 Professor Jill Fisch
argues that Delaware law may be indeterminate but attests that this
indeterminacy makes it flexible. 229 She claims that Delaware law is
unique because it leaves major corporate law components, including
the business judgment rule, the duty of loyalty, and responses to
hostile takeovers, to the judiciary. 23 0 In sum, Fisch argues that the
effect of the pseudo-legislative activity of the Delaware courts and
their use of standards rather than rules creates a unique judicial
process that may prove to be of great benefit to litigants desiring fair,
23 1
flexible, and timely rulings.
Professor Douglas Branson also argues that Delaware law is
indeterminate but reasons that Delaware law remains predictable
unless the parties are engaged in high-stakes litigation. 232 In those
high-stakes cases, Delaware's courts do not have the stabilizing
influence of interest groups concerned with jobs and the effect on local
communities, and those states do not have a strong corporate bar
influence. 233 Branson posits that Delaware corporate bar's influence on
litigation increases indeterminacy, because Delaware's lawyers derive
a benefit from advising out-of-state law firms on complex issues of
Delaware law-especially in complex high-stakes cases. Therefore, the
Delaware corporate bar's interest in complex law balances
23 4
corporations' desire for consistency and simplicity.
In sum, all of the contentions about indeterminacy of Delaware
law and, alternatively, the appearance of settled precedent, lead to the
conclusion that states cannot compete directly with Delaware 235 but
instead should seek their own niche where Delaware has not yet
blazed a trail. 236 Michigan and Maryland can answer this call by
targeting their approach toward high-tech litigants rather than the
larger public corporations on which Delaware already has a strong

228. Fisch, supra note 7, at 1071.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 1074.
231. Id. at 1099-1100.
232. Branson, supra note 18, at 112-13.
233. Id. at 113 n. 134.
234. Id. at 92-93.
235. Kamar, supra note 28, at 1955.
236. See Romano, supra note 6, at 714-18 (discussing the possible effects of product
differentiation on other state's laws and the competition for corporate charters in general).
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grip, because, as noted above, it is difficult to beat Delaware on its
237

own turf.

B. The Appearance of Due Process:Reconciling the Cyber Court's and
Litigants' Expectations
Legitimacy has always been an important part of the court
system. As legitimate and appropriate fora for resolving disputes,
courts must preserve litigants' due process expectations. 238 Professor
Dreyfuss notes that for a court to be successful, it must allay concerns
raised when the specialized tribunal departs from the status quo. 23 9
Two of the most common problems raised by specialized tribunals are
specialized rules of procedure and the threat of increased lobbying for
judicial appointment. 240 It follows that if litigants do not trust the
court's procedure or if they believe that the judges are too political or
too partisan in their decisionmaking, then they will not take
advantage of the forum, and Michigan and Maryland will be less likely
to succeed in their ultimate goal of attracting businesses to their state.
Increased lobbying occurs because it is more cost-effective
when the court is specialized. 241 A corporation may not receive a
sufficient return on its investment if it spends money on a generalist
judge who may or may not hear many business cases. With specialized
courts, the industry knows that the judge will be setting precedent in
her particular area of expertise and therefore that it will receive a
better return on its investment. Thus, because of the increased return,
businesses will be more likely to invest money and time toward
lobbying or electing specialized judges. 242 Further, litigants will be
aware of lobbying and may seek to increase the public perception that
the political process influences judges, even if judges are actually
impartial in their decisions.
Court procedure and structure in Delaware address both of
these substantive concerns. First, Delaware is a traditional court
system and does not implement any special methods or procedures
outside of its little-used special litigation panel. 243 Further, because
Delaware appoints its judges in a purposefully bipartisan manner,

237. For a discussion of Michigan's and Maryland's abilities to capture the high-tech sector,
see infra Section VII.A.
238. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 15.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 21.
241. Id. Lobbying can also disrupt the quality of decisionmaking. See supra Part VII.A.1.
242. Id.
243. See supra note 18.
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rather than electing them, the state avoids problems arising from
campaign finance and lobbying during the election process. 244 In
addition, corporations in Delaware tend to be repeat players, finding
themselves on both sides of an issue, and lobbying efforts therefore
often balance out. 245 Commentators also note that because of a rich
history of business litigation, Delaware has a powerful and influential
corporate bar with a vested interest ensuring certain that Delaware
246
does not become too biased in any one direction.
When considering the effect of these new court procedures on
of due process and confidence in the courts' decisions
perception
the
regarding substantive law, the analysis differs for the Maryland
proposal and the Michigan Cyber Court. While the Maryland proposal
247 it
advocates technological advancements such as electronic filing,
does not go as far as the Michigan Cyber Court in establishing a court
with facilities that will conduct all hearings using audio, video, and
Internet conferencing. 248 Maryland, in fact, proposes to act within its
Differentiated Case Management System, which already separates out
certain cases for special treatment, and the proposal only plans to
extend that option to litigants with business- or technology-oriented
disputes. 249 Maryland's proposal to act within the existing court
system and its less radical departure from the state's judicial norms
250
would probably raise fewer fairness concerns from litigants.
Michigan's move marks a larger departure from the normal
course of hearing cases. Michigan's response to concerns that a
potential litigant may have is to allow removal to the intermediate
appellate courts by either party under section 8011 of the Cyber Court
Act. 25 1 This provision also has the added benefit of removing any
problems caused by a disparity in the parties' technological
capabilities and helps to allay the concern that solo practitioners
working in small firms will be disadvantaged by large-firm, large244. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (providing that Delaware judges are appointed by the governor
and then approved by the legislature).
245. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 22-24.
246. Branson, supra note 18, at 113.
247. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 15-16.

248. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 8015.
249. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 6-9.

250. Admittedly, all of these due process concerns are somewhat subjective; this Note does
not attempt to determine whether or not these courts can deprive litigants of their due process
protections. It is likely that no substantial due process concerns exist because of the limited
jurisdiction of these courts, and the option, already the law in Michigan, that either party may
remove the case to a nonspecialized court. § 8011.
251. § 8011. Presumably, this waiver, along with the parties' voluntary assent to the use of
videoconferencing will remove any constitutional due process concerns. See supra Part IV
(discussing United States v. Baker).
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budget use of the cyber court's technology. 252 The need to consent to
the use of videoconferencing and to a high-technology method of
conducting hearings and trials also reduces a litigant's concerns that
253
technology may distort perceptions. Again, as discussed above,
videoconferencing can be viewed as another adversarial tool, like
coaching witnesses to improve their credibility, and therefore may not
254
skew a trial as much as one might initially assume.
The removal provision, however, is not without its problems. To
allay due process concerns, Michigan has reduced the court's ability to
establish predictable precedent. Allowing a litigant to remove the case
to a court of general jurisdiction certainly reduces the cyber court's
ability to establish reliable precedent and reduces a corporation's
ability to rely on the cyber court as a forum in which it can resolve
disputes. In fact, the removal provision could become a litigation
strategy-if time is of the essence to one party and not the other, as
the other party may choose to remove the case specifically to delay
resolution.
The removal provisions also fail to address adequately concerns
regarding the effect on third parties to the litigation.255 Even if a party
never chooses to bring a case in front of the Michigan Cyber Court, by
virtue of using section 8011, it may still have to address cyber court
precedent. This consideration is especially relevant if courts accord
greater deference to cyber court opinions than to business law
opinions from general trial courts. If Michigan seeks to create a cyber
court with predictable outcomes, it must demonstrate to litigants that
the cyber court protects due process concerns and must make an effort
to create consistent precedent at the appellate level. 256 Although
resolving some disputes in the business court and others in courts of
general jurisdiction may not lead to certainty as quickly, it will offer
the appellate courts a broader view of the law and therefore may

252. Lederer, supra note 75, at 831-32.
253. See supra Part IV.
254. See Roth, supra note 87, at 206-07.
255. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation:The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Federal Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1485 (1992) (noting that states engaging in
the race for corporate charters focus on the potential corporate litigants and not on third parties
potentially affected by adjudications).
256. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 27-29. Certainly, this is of special concern in Michigan,
where removal could be to any one of the fifty-seven circuit courts with 210 judges. STATE COURT
ORGANIZATION, supra note 217, at 27; see also Part VII.A (discussing how generalized appellate
review may serve to eliminate concerns of disparate precedent).
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improve the quality of the appellate courts' rulings, reducing the
257
effects of overspecialization discussed above.
Unless Michigan can level the playing field, ensure that all
qualifying parties are able to use the cyber court effectively, and
adequately compensate for any doubts in the trustworthiness of audio,
video, and Internet conferencing, concerns for due process concerns
will be raised, and public confidence in the court may diminish.
However, as Frederic Lederer points out, the development of state-run
and state-funded cyber courts with their own technology and facilities
for use by any qualifying party may actually reduce any perceived
disparity between large firms and solo practitioners. 258 Therefore,
small practitioners may be as willing as large firms to use a
technology court, if the state makes the technology affordable and
accessible. Further, disparity in the skill and capability of the parties
is inherent in the legal system. Simply put, some lawyers and law
firms are better suited than others to some cases, and it is legal
inadequacy rather than unequal advocacy that the law requires for
relief.2 59 Litigants therefore may be willing to accept some disparity in
these cyber courts because they accept disparity in other forums.
Michigan and Maryland may be in a special situation, however,
because of the focus of their courts. Both states focus not just on
business, but high technology business, 260 and firms that deal with
and create technology on a daily basis may be more willing to accept
technology in the courtroom and throughout the legal process.
Further, technology industries may be able to accept greater
inconsistency in the general corporate or business law in exchange for
judges who are more familiar with the evidentiary and substantive
261
legal aspects of high-technology industry.

257. See Posner, supra note 30, at 785-86 (discussing the effects of judicial monopoly on
decisions).
258. Lederer, supra note 75, at 832-33. Lederer also points out that the assumption that solo
practitioners will be less skilled in the use of technology may be inaccurate, because lawyers in
small firms often have little or no support staff and will have to become more familiar with
technology on their own. Id. at 832. For a solo practitioner's view on the use of technology, see
Jesse J. Richardson, How a Sole Practitioner Uses the "Electronic Office" to Maintain a
Competitive Law Practice,3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 141 (1998).
259. Lederer, supra note 75, at 832.
260. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 8001(f) (stating the purpose of "supplement[ing] other state
programs designed to make the state attractive to technology driven companies"); see also
MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 1 (stating that "the Task Force recommends
establishing a statewide program to resolve substantial disputes affecting business entities,
including the unique and specialized issues involving technology" (emphasis added)).
261. See discusion supra Part VIII.
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C. The Rocket Docket Takes off into Cyberspace: Will Michigan's Cyber
Court Improve Efficiency?
Dreyfuss contends that a court's efficiency, defined as the
court's ability to resolve disputes within the time frame that litigants
262
require, is key to its success as a specialized business court.
Dreyfuss states that Delaware excels in this area: "Cases cannot be
adjudicated any more efficiently than Delaware is currently
adjudicating them. Therefore, the only way states could move their
dockets more quickly would be to compromise on the due process or
quality parameters." 263 Specifically, she notes that when the Delaware
Chancery Court reviewed the complex dispute involving QVC and
Viacom's tender offers for Paramount, the court was able to finish the
and review
briefing in two-and-a-half weeks and then to assimilate
264
days.
nine
mere
a
in
briefs
over four hundred pages of
Efficiency generally decreases litigation costs through firm
trial dates and faster procedures. Attorneys will spend less time and
money on trial preparation, because they are less likely to have to
prepare for trial more than once as a result because of fewer
continuances. 265 Less pretrial time also means less time spent
266
deposing witnesses and preparing and answering interrogatories.
Delay may also deny justice by causing inequitable settlement when
one party can afford to wait and the other cannot, resulting in a
disproportionate benefit to the party who is able to retain the value of
267
a judgment throughout the delay.
for
provide further explanation
Other commentators
26
8
Delaware's small judiciary
Delaware's impressive efficiency record.
and small population reduce the number of cases competing for the
judges' time and limits the influence of potentially disparate precedent
created by a large number of judges. 269 Furthermore, Delaware
simplifies appeals and the generation of precedent by allowing direct
appeals to the Delaware Supreme Court. Commentators observe that
courts in Delaware are not prone to localized concerns, such as the

262. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 14.
263. Id. at 37.
264. QVC Network Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993),
affld, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994); Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 20-21.
265. Johnson, supra note 43, at 230.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 230-32.
268. Alva, supra note 14, at 917-19.
269. Id.; see also Kamar, supra note 28, at 1925-26.
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creation of jobs and the effects on local communities, that complicate
corporate disputes in other jurisdictions, because most of the
companies incorporated in Delaware have their principle places of
business in other states. 270 The best explanation identifies a lack of
local concerns coupled with a small judiciary and a large body of case
law as the factors that allow Delaware to resolve disputes quickly.
Michigan and Maryland do not imitate Delaware by providing
a limit on the number of judges involved with corporate law decisions.
Maryland's proposal places the business and technology track within
the same confines as all other trial courts in the state. Therefore, no
additional expedited or simple appeals process exists beyond that
offered to all Maryland litigants. 27 1 In Michigan, appeals from the
cyber court proceed to the appropriate Court of Appeals in Michigan
and not directly to the Michigan Supreme Court. 272 A litigant, and
other interested parties, therefore a second time before receiving a
definitive answer from Michigan's highest court. This is especially
problematic given the voluntary nature of these forums and the
resultant potential for competing precedent from the general and
specialized courts. 2 73 Again, it becomes apparent that Delaware is in a
truly unique position because of its small population and its court
system dominated by corporate litigation. 274 Instead of reducing,
expediting, or sending the appeals to a specialized appellate court,
Michigan and Maryland must counterbalance Delaware's small
judiciary and corporate caseload with the use of potentially superior
procedures for processing cases and judges familiar with hightechnology litigation.
To say that there is no way for any court to compete with or
improve upon Delaware's efficiency ignores the potential impact of
technology and novel avenues for streamlining the judicial process. 275
Here, comparison with Delaware may be less relevant. While

270. Alva, supra note 13, at 918-19.
271. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 12-13.

272. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 8021.
273. See Hon. Barbara A. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to Professor
Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 147 (1997) (recognizing the decreased predictability in
bankruptcy law when both district courts and bankruptcy appellate panels hear appeals from
bankruptcy judges).
274. Alva, supra note 14, at 902-03.
275. One example outside the creation of specialized judges is the use of "special masters" to
handle complex evidence or disputes. For an examination of the use of specialized master, see
Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 EMORY L.J.
927, 988-90 (1994).
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Delaware responds to the litigants' timing needs, 276 the proper basis of
comparison for Michigan and Maryland to measure success in
providing fast and fair adjudication may be the rocket docket in the
Eastern District of Virginia. 277 The Eastern District of Virginia does
not have the systemic attributes of a particularized caseload mix and
small judiciary like the Delaware judiciary, so that model is more
readily exportable to another forum. However, neither Michigan,
Maryland, nor the Eastern District of Virginia replicates Delaware's
expedited appeals process, and that fact may prove as relevant as fast
and fair proceedings at the trial level. Certainly, Michigan and
Maryland believe that improvement upon, or equalization with,
Delaware's speed is possible. Both the Maryland proposal and the
Michigan Cyber Court attempt to increase speed with discrete
procedures and with specialized judges who will take less time than
generalist judges to become familiar with technology issues, both
2 78
evidentiary and substantive.
If meeting the parties' expectations is the key, the Maryland
proposal provides litigants with a choice between two tracks within
the business and technology program-an expedited and a regular
track. 279 The expedited track provides for a trial within ninety days,
while the standard track provides for trial within nine months. 28 0 The
choice of tracks should meet litigants' expectations, but these tracks
alone are insufficient. The Maryland proposal should include rules
like those in the Eastern District of Virginia that ensure that these
dates are firm from the outset and perhaps also discovery rules
designed to reduce the amount of travel for depositions and the
number of interrogatories and depositions taken. 28 1 Maryland can best
replicate the effects of Delaware's small judiciary through the use of
its existing expedited appeals system. 28 2 That system, coupled with
the tracks within the Maryland court system, may force the courts to
decide business disputes quickly and completely. No such option exists

276. Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 20-21 (noting the chancery courts' knowledge of the financial
markets and their ability to hear disputes quickly when necessary).
277. A number of other federal districts have created rocket dockets in response to the Civil
Justice Reform Act's encouragement of sending cases to trial. See Johnson, supra note 43, at 23334 (describing the permissibility of rocket dockets in the federal system).
278. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 6.
279. Id. at 11.
280. Id.
281. Koenig, supra note 53, at 807-09.
282. MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 13.
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in Delaware. Instead, the chancellors make subjective determinations
when deciding how quickly they will decide cases. 28 3
Michigan is further along in the process than Maryland, and
the Michigan Cyber Court draft rules allow for a deeper analysis of
efficiency measures. The first means of increasing efficiency is through
the requirement that all litigants choosing the cyber court have audio
and videoconferencing capability, 28 4 and be certified as electronic filers
in the cyber court. 28 5 In the Eastern District of Virginia, the court
places restrictions on taking depositions that involve travel in order to
eliminate wasted travel time and expense, 28 6 but the Michigan
approach allows the court to go farther. No restrictions need be placed
on travel, because litigants are able to depose and confer with the
judge for hearings and other proceedings through the use of audio and
28 7
video technology.
Despite all of this technology, there is no equivalent in
Michigan to the Eastern District of Virginia's Rule 16 obligating the
court to limit continuances and extensions to those for good cause. 288
Without this sort of commitment, no amount of technology will
necessarily accelerate resolution of conflicts. However, because the
very nature of the cyber court seems directed at increasing speed and
efficiency, and because the cyber court is voluntary, it is unlikely that
litigants choosing the court will move slowly. It is also unlikely that
judges will allow parties to slow down the process, but a firm public
commitment to the efficient resolution embodied in a cyber court rule
would notify potential litigants and reinforce the court's commitment
to speedy dispute resolution. Such a rule would reduce the potential
for arbitrary decisions regarding the importance of a case or rulings on
continuance requests by providing a standard on which judges should
base those decisions. 28 9
A possible drawback of rocket dockets for states looking to
develop predictable corporate law is that while they speed the
resolution of disputes through the use of their early and firm trial
dates, they may increase the likelihood of settlement. 290 Although this
283. However, as discussed earlier, Delaware does seem amenable to deciding cases on an
expedited timetable when possible, so practice, rather than rule, may alleviate this concern. See
supra note 211 and accompanying text.
284. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 8015 (stating that "all matters ... shall be heard by means
of electronic communication...") (emphasis added).
285. MICH. CYBER CT. DR. R. 2.102A.

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

E.D. VA. LOCAL R. 16.
§ 8015.
E.D. VA. LOCAL R. 16.
See Johnson, supra note 43, at 255.
Id. at 240-41.
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point is debatable, 291 and parties may be pleased to settle cases, it
raises some concerns for states like Michigan and Maryland that seek
to attract businesses. 292 Carr and Jencks raise several problems with
encouraging settlement and ADR. 29 3 Concerns about excessive private
resolution of disputes include: loss of information, the reduction of the
public welfare, 294 the widening of the gap between the haves and havenots, 2 95 and a reduction in the power of the courts. 296 The underlying
29 7
theme of all of these concerns is the loss of information to the public.
Further, some commentators have stated that a move toward
increased ADR raises due process concerns, because private parties
may be able to subvert substantive law by private and judicially
enforceable dispute resolution. 298 While some businesses do value
secrecy, it is sometimes better for all litigants, and potentially for a
particular business in the future, to come to a public resolution that
will govern future conduct in that area of law. In this sense, Michigan
and Maryland have a vested interest in ensuring that corporations
actually utilize their new systems, because as the system develops
law, it only becomes more attractive and more comparable to
Delaware's highly developed body of case law. 299 Neither state will
become the Delaware of high-tech law until some foundation exists for
judges, lawyers, and academics to use in determining and predicting
corporate law in those states.

291. See id. (stating that delay, not speed, encourages settlement and noting that
noneconomic considerations may influence the settlement process and that perhaps an early trial
date will encourage parties to begin acting cooperatively earlier than if the trial date were far in
the future).
292. Romano, supra note 222, at 227; see also Eisenberg, supra note 222, at 150; see also
Dreyfuss supra note 14, at 25-26.
293. Carr & Jencks, supra note 35, at 228.
294. Id. at 228-29. Carr and Jencks use an example of an agreement between State Farm
and Whirlpool Corporation to settle all subrogation claims through ADR. Id. Carr and Jencks
argue that this method of resolution violates public policy by keeping the public uninformed of
potential product flaws. Id. They claim that courts possess adequate measures to ensure secrecy,
and that litigants should be encouraged to use those measures. Id.
295. Id. at 230-31 (suggesting that good judges will help to level the playing field between
experienced corporate lawyers and young attorneys representing plaintiffs).
296. Id. at 231-32 (stating that business is a powerful force in society and that if it removes
itself from the courts through ADR, courts will not have as much of an effect on society); see also
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Going Private: Technology, Due Process, and Internet Dispute
Resolution, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 151, 212-13 (2000) (highlighting the dangers of allowing
private rules to substitute for public law).
297. See Chemerinsky, supra note 201, at 130 (discussing the advantages of court opinions as
opposed to unreported ADR decisions in bankruptcy law).
298. See Thornburg, supra note 297, at 154.
299. See Kamar, supra note 28, at 1926 (stating that even if other states recruit experienced
jurists, they would lose their advantage if those courts do not handle enough cases).
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D. Conclusion: Will Michigan's and Maryland'sFocus on High-Tech
Businesses Provide an Avenue for Success?
The foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that neither
Michigan nor Maryland will overtake Delaware as the preeminent
forum for resolving general corporate disputes. However, that
objective may not be either state's goal in proposing or implementing
new judicial tools for business dispute resolution. These two states
have chosen not to target business in general, but instead to set their
sights on high-tech business. 300 Michigan and Maryland assume that
high-technology businesses value speedy resolution of trials, 30 1 the use
of technology in the courtroom, substantive consideration of the needs
of high-tech firms, and judges skilled in business disputes who are
committed to gaining training in the evidentiary nature of technology
more than the benefits offered by the Delaware courts. In order to be
successful, Michigan and Maryland must offer both procedural and
substantive options that are more attractive to corporations than
those available in Delaware-one without the other will not prove
effective.
Success against Delaware, even in this narrow area, is
unlikely. If Michigan's and Maryland's goal is to compete for corporate
charters, then they must distinguish themselves from Delaware by
relying on the idea that high-technology companies have different
procedural and substantive needs than traditional businesses.
Delaware may have a well-developed body of case law, but that
precedent focuses on the needs of traditional large corporations rather
than on the needs of emerging high-tech companies. Finally, the
Delaware judges, while specialized in corporate law, lack
specialization in handling the technological evidence that is presented
to the court in a high-tech business dispute. Finally, Delaware does
not have a firm grip on all of the noncorporate aspects of corporate
existence, because while a majority of corporations have incorporated
in Delaware, far fewer are actually located there. What effect the sum
of these factors will have on corporate law-as opposed to on
intellectual property law-is difficult to anticipate. In a sense, to win
the race for corporate charters for high-technology corporations,
Michigan and Maryland are counting on the fact that high-technology
companies have different corporate law needs-for example, different
fiduciary duty law-than traditional businesses. An analysis of

300. See Engler, supra note 11.
301. Carr & Jencks, supra note 35, at 197 (noting the particularly high speed at which hightech companies operate).
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Michigan's and Maryland's chances of success cannot be properly
undertaken in a corporate law vacuum but must include the corporate
and substantive law of the state of incorporation and of the state of
location.
One consideration, which may provide an avenue for limited
success, but which was not taken into account in the foregoing
analysis, is the "developing" nature of many high-technology firms.
High-technology firms, especially those that Michigan and Maryland
seek to attract, are unlikely to be large public companies, but instead
are more likely to be small corporations that have not yet had their
initial public offering. 30 2 By capturing firms early, Michigan and
Maryland may be able to keep those corporations past the initial startup phase by inducing the firm to locate in the forum state, providing
efficient dispute resolution, and thereby reducing the incentive to
reincorporate. Delaware has not focused on small emerging businesses
in this manner. Incorporation behavior seems to reflect the hypothesis
that Delaware is dominant with regard to America's largest
corporations rather than being a haven for small businesses. 30 3 In fact,
taken together, Delaware's high franchise fees and arguably the
Delaware Law of Corporations and Business Organizations and case
law only serve to illustrate that Delaware is not as concerned with
small emerging businesses, nor is it as concerned with where
businesses locate, than with where they incorporate. 30 4 Given the fact
that many corporations reincorporate in Delaware once they reach a
certain size leads to the conclusion that this strategy will not be
entirely effective.
VIII. LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION: COMPETING FOR LOCATION,
NOT INCORPORATION
Michigan and Maryland may not actually be competing with
Delaware for corporate charters but may instead be (or should be)
engaged in competitive behavior in order to induce businesses to locate
as opposed to incorporate in their states. 30 5 Kahan and Kamar, in The
Myth of State Competition in CorporateLaw, observe that a number of

302. See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator:Lawyers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 679, 685-86 (1996)
(stating that Silicon Valley is built on the venture capital used to fund and support start-ups,
most of which do not survive until public offering).
303. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 1061.
304. See O'KELLEY & THOMPSON, supra note 4, at 1052-53.
305. See generally Kahan & Kamar, supra note 10 (stating that competition for corporate
charters is a myth).
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states are not really competing in the race for corporate charters and
note that the advantages of winning the race for corporate charters do
not outweigh the costs of engaging in the race. 30 6 Ultimately, however,
public statements, such as Michigan Governor John Engler's
statement that the cyber court will allow Michigan to become the
Delaware of high-tech law, 307 seem to indicate that states perceive
themselves as competing for corporate charters. States who wish to
compete for corporate charters, even with regard to a particular sector
of the economy, are unlikely to succeed. As such, those states should
refocus their efforts and publicly change their stance to attracting
businesses to locate, rather than to reincorporate, in their states.
Michigan's and Maryland's actions demonstrate a desire to go
beyond attracting mere incorporation to encouraging location as well.
For example, Michigan's jurisdictional grant goes beyond claims
associated with corporations merely incorporated in the forum state by
including contractual agreements, such as trade secrets, noncompetes, disputes arising out of commercial transactions including
those with banks, business, or commercial insurance, and commercial
real property other than landlord/tenant. 30 8 This broader grant
demonstrates that, while perhaps not clearly stated, Michigan's goal is
broader than the race for corporate charters, because it places areas of
law within the cyber court's jurisdiction that have little bearing on the
actions of a corporation merely incorporated in the forum state.
Furthermore, while Governor Engler stated that he wanted Michigan
to become the Delaware of high-tech law, 30 9 he did so in the context of
a speech full of directives designed to increase the presence of hightech businesses in Michigan.3 10 In this context, it seems that
Michigan's goal, and perhaps Maryland's goal as well, is to increase
the number of businesses located in the state and not necessarily to
increase the number of corporations incorporated there.
Given that Michigan and Maryland may not actually be
competing for corporate charters and may be more concerned with the
location of a business, a comparison to Delaware alone seems
insufficient. Many factors examined above, including efficiency,
quality of decisionmaking, and due process concerns, apply equally to
courts not specifically designed to address corporate law issues.
However, to complete the analysis, one needs to explore an area of the
country successful not in getting high-technology businesses to
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id.
Engler, supra note 11.
2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 600.8005(2)(b)-(f.
See Engler, supra note 11.
Id.
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incorporate, but where high-technology businesses have chosen to
locate. California's Silicon Valley fits this description well. Silicon
Valley boasts the highest concentration of technology companies, and
examining its laws and the needs of emerging technology companies
will demonstrate how Michigan and Maryland may be able to attract
high-technology businesses to locate, as well as incorporate, in their
3 11
states.
Suchman and Cahill attribute much of Silicon Valley's success
to the availability of venture capital and the role that lawyers play in
managing the uncertainty inherent in adapting existing corporate law
to the nature of high-tech business. 3 12 Suchman and Cahill describe an
environment in which lawyers deal with uncertainty by absorbing
transaction-specific uncertainties, by educating newcomers, and by
establishing practices that guide judicial interpretation of the
preferred contractual provisions. 313 In Michigan and Maryland, courts
familiar with high-technology businesses' concerns may provide the
legal support needed to develop an emerging high-technology firm.
Other commentators relate Silicon Valley's success to the labor
market and trade secret and covenant-not-to-compete laws that
support its high-technology industry. 31 4 Professor Ronald Gilson posits
that high-technology industries will benefit from different legal rules
than traditional businesses in areas governing intellectual property
and employee mobility. 31 5 Gilson notes that a key aspect of Silicon
Valley's legal infrastructure is California's refusal to enforce
covenants not to compete, which facilitates knowledge transfer
between firms and encourages innovation. 31 6
Instead of recommending that states emulate California's
refusal to enforce covenants not to compete, Gilson advocates an
industry-by-industry approach to structuring covenants not to
compete and fashioning appropriate rules to protect intellectual
property and prohibit or encourage employee mobility. 317 Gilson states
that the best legal infrastructure may be one with the flexibility to
311. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 302, at 684-85 ("Over 60% of the American
Electronics Association's 1,800 members have their corporate headquarters in California ... in
1990 more than 3,000 high-technology establishments of one kind or another were operating in
the region, employing roughly 267,000 people.").
312. Id. at 690-91 (stating that Silicon Valley lawyers foster market development and
suppress business disputes).
313. Id. at 709.
314. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology Industrial Districts:
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999).
315. Id. at 577.
316. Id. at 577-78.
317. Id. at 628.
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balance the needs of external economies with the protection of
intellectual property rights. 318 Michigan and Maryland do not include
employment in their cyber court jurisdictions, but those courts will
hear cases involving trade secrets, non-compete disputes, and
business-to-business disputes regarding high-technology information
and movements of the labor force and information. 3 9 Certainly,
expertise and experience in dealing with high-technology disputes
would improve the courts' understanding of the flow of intellectual
capital in the high-tech industry and would provide an excellent forum
for balancing the need for intellectual property protection with the
need for employee mobility.
In states like Michigan and Maryland, one could reason that
what is most important is that some group (whether it be lawyers, the
legislature, or judges) be able to deal with uncertainty when
fashioning law geared toward the high-risk, high-turnover
environment and close corporate structure that is central to the hightech community. 320 Such specialization in dealing with high-tech
businesses, which are more likely to be closely held corporations, could
open a door for Michigan and Maryland to capture a piece of the
market to which Delaware does not directly appeal. 32' Further, if
given the opportunity to deal with high-tech disputes on a regular
basis, Michigan and Maryland courts may develop a specialty in
employment, trade secret, and covenant-not-to-compete laws and may
be able to design their laws to meet the needs of a developing hightechnology community. 322
The unique importance of a highly skilled and specially trained
workforce in the high-tech sector may cause high-tech businesses to
prefer a court system developing predictable laws upon which those
corporations can rely to protect their trade secrets and intellectual
capital. Also, because the high-tech industry changes so quickly, the
advanced use of technology and a rocket docket system may allow
these companies to settle disputes rapidly and therefore will allow
high-tech firms to resolve disputes before the technology or skills that
they are using become obsolete. Michigan and Maryland business
courts' jurisdiction includes trade secrets and covenants not to
compete, 323 and the ability to balance those intellectual property
318. Id. at 629.
319. 2001 Mich. Pub. Acts 262, § 600.8005(3)(a)-(f; see also MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 145, at 9-10.

320. See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 303, at 685-86.
321. See Eisenberg, supra note 222, at 1525-26.
322. See Gilson, supra note 314, at 629.
323. § 600.8005(3)(a)-(f); see also MARYLAND TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 145, at 9-10.
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concerns, deal with high-tech evidence, and provide a fast resolution of
disputes may influence some companies to locate their operations in
Michigan or Maryland.
All of this speculation should not be taken to mean that there
is no value to corporate law specifically addressing high-tech or small
corporate concerns. Professor Melvin Eisenberg provides evidence of
one instance in which close corporations and public corporations will
differ-the need for contractual freedom. 324 Other commentators agree
and state that as business moves into the next century, private
ordering will become more important. 325 One area in which private
ordering affects existing legal rules is with regard to fiduciary
duties. 326 Eisenberg concludes that closely held corporations need
contractual freedom in creating their internal governance rules but
they also need mandatory fiduciary rules applicable to private
agreements to prevent the dangers of systematic unforeseeability and
exploitation of minority interests. 327 The variation in control and
fiduciary rules that small firms desire is more problematic for, and
perhaps more damaging to, publicly held corporations, because such
changes could reduce the accountability of inefficient managers and
make those managers difficult to remove. 328
Perhaps the most difficult counterarguments as to why hightech companies might not want to break new ground by locating (or
incorporating) in Michigan and Maryland relate to investor response
and the nature of high-tech litigation. First, investors who invest in a
new high-tech corporation are investing in a potentially risky field. 329
Because investors are taking a risk on the success of a corporation's
product, 33 0 they may not be willing to take a risk with regard to the
choice of law and therefore may prefer the default choice of

324. Eisenberg, supra note 222, at 1525-26. High-tech firms may have different concerns
than traditional businesses in other areas as well. See Henry J. Perritt, Jr., Dispute Resolution in
Electronic Network Communities, 38 VILL. L. REV. 349, 365 (1993) (noting the special
consideration needed to govern electronic networks); see also Joseph Bankman, The Structure of
Silicon Valley Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737 (1994) (noting the special considerations and tax
implications of emerging technology companies).
325. Symposium, What Business Will Look for in CorporateLaw in the Twenty-First Century,
25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 6, 22 (2000) (remarking that while Delaware is the place to be right now, in
the future corporations will look to fora that support private ordering).
326. See Eisenberg, supra note 222, at 1470.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 1524-25.
329. Suchman & Cahill, supra note 311, at 685 (stating that over sixty percent of start-up
companies will enter bankruptcy before investors can recoup their original stake and that less
that ten percent reach their initial public offering).
330. Id. at 687.
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Delaware. 331 This choice may reflect the investors' belief that only
Delaware is sufficiently committed to its corporate law because of the
332
state's heavy reliance on proceeds from franchise taxes.
Further problems stem from the federal nature of much of the
law that is important to high-technology firms. The types of law that
are typically associated with high-technology firms are copyright,
patent, trademark, and other intellectual property concerns. Those
laws have become increasingly federal in nature, and thus resolution
333
of those issues remains firmly in the hands of the federal courts.
Software and high-technology firms do have an interest in the rapid
resolution of their business claims, but the fact that the federal
government has limited the state's role in intellectual property may
reduce a high-tech business's incentive to reincorporate or locate in
Michigan or Maryland. However, as Gilson notes, state law still has a
significant effect on intellectual property through trade secret law and
covenants not to compete, 334 and therefore such a federal preemption
argument may not carry as much weight as it seems at first blush.
The nature of these potential substantive law differences
highlights the importance of the court system reforms in Michigan
and Maryland. Substantive law changes alone are insufficient to
attract corporations to locate in a forum state, because many of the
noncorporate substantive law issues could be integrated into a
contract through a choice-of-law provision. Adding a choice-of-law
clause to a contract between businesses located outside of Michigan or
Maryland provides no benefit to the forum state, as parties using such
clauses do not have to pay any fee to that state nor be located or
incorporated in that state. Thus, in order to derive any value from
laws friendly to high-technology businesses, Michigan and Maryland

331. Herd behavior may play an important role in the success of Delaware's corporate law.
See Marcel Kahn & Michael Klasner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing
Returns, Herd Behavior, and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 347, 366 (1996) (noting that
standardization may even cause firms to use contractual terms and choose laws that do not
maximize their value). There also seems to be evidence that firms reincorporating in Delaware
see significant gains. See, e.g., Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate
Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus. 259, 275, 281 (1980)
(finding firms that reincorporate in Delaware enjoy positive returns greater than thirty percent
over a twenty-five-month period pending reincorporation).
332. Kamar, supra note 28, at 1927.
333. In fact, this is one area in which the federal courts have become quite specialized.
United States patent law requires that most patent infringement appeals be brought in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. As a result, that circuit has developed a
great deal of expertise and specialization in that area of law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4). For a
detailed analysis of the court's functioning, its successes, and its failures, see Rochelle C.
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit:A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989).
334. See Gilson, supra note 314, at 629.
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must provide an added service that is only available to businesses
conferring a benefit on Michigan and Maryland. The cyber court
systems provide this benefit. In order to use the court systems, a
business must act in a way such that it or its business partner is
subject to the jurisdiction of Maryland or Michigan's courts. In doing
so, they presumably will have contact with Michigan or Marylandeither by doing business there or by locating there. Either way,
Michigan and Maryland will receive a tangible benefit in the form of
commercial activity in the state-which is quite possibly the real goal
of these business court proposals.
Ultimately, only time will tell whether high-technology firms
will have specialized needs in state court proceedings that would
require a different cost-benefit analysis when choosing a state in
which to locate. However, the playing field for competition in the race
for location, as opposed to incorporation, is more open, and a strong
argument can be made that Michigan and Maryland have taken an
important step to augment their attractiveness to new businesses.
Battling Delaware for incorporation may be a fruitless endeavor, but
improving the court system to serve litigants located in the forum
state may provide some benefit.
IX. CONCLUSION: SOME RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATES CREATING
SPECIALIZED BUSINESS COURTS

From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that while
Michigan and Maryland will not be able to compete directly with
Delaware for corporate charters, these states can provide a forum that
will appeal to certain types of businesses deciding where to locate.
Furthermore, much of the law and expertise that high-tech firms seek
is not determined by the state of incorporation, but rather by the state
of location, and Delaware has certainly not cornered the market in
terms of business location. However, in order to meet these demands,
state courts like those in Michigan and Maryland must institute
several safeguards to compete with Delaware.
To serve the constituency a state desires to attract, state
legislatures must carefully define the scope of the specialty court's
jurisdiction and tailor it to the areas of law most important to that
type of business. In so doing, states should remember that
incorporation does not equal increased business activity in the state
and should provide law based on the state of location, not
incorporation. Also, states should take special care to make certain
that appellate court review consolidates opinions emanating from both
the business or specialty courts and the general courts.
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To create a reliable and consistent legal environment and to
avoid encouraging an excess of ADR, courts should create a body of
written opinions upon which future litigants may rely. 335 Courts
should also take a proactive approach and use cases as an opportunity
not only to resolve current disputes, but also to guide future business
3 36
activity.
To avoid the heightened risks of industry capture associated
with specialized tribunals, states should create procedures that will
both select qualified and interested judges and insulate them from the
political process by adopting standards for selection based on
experience, interest, and aptitude. 337 In addition, states should create
a balance between political parties and ideologies to prevent the law
338
from vascillating.
To create confidence in the court's decisions, states should
enact appropriate measures to reduce litigants' due process concerns.
Beyond just creating good court rules, states should promote their
courts and demonstrate their ability and fairness to the public,
because when jurisdiction is voluntary, public perception can be as
important as actual rules. 339 Furthermore, states should develop rules
designed to deal with the potential for conflicting cases and generalist
review without destroying the benefits of specialization.
To combat the problems of judicial backlog and to address
resulting efficiency concerns while reducing the public's due process
concerns, states should give litigants the option of selecting fast-track
litigation and should keep judges committed to speedy resolution of
justice through court rules.
In order to avoid remaining in Delaware's shadow, states
should encourage courts to review and consider Delaware case law on
important points of law, but to avoid following the herd and directly
adopting Delaware law. 340 Instead, states should offer some
distinguished difference targeted to a subset of businesses or
addressing a particular legal concern, because direct competition with

335. See Carr & Jencks, supra note 35, at 221-33 (describing the dangers inherent in
increased privatization).
336. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 1079-80.
337. See Gibbons, supra note 190.
338. See Branson, supra note 18, at 90-91 (describing how Delaware is in the unique position
of having strong lobbying groups on both sides of most corporate law issues).
339. See Dreyfuss, supra note 14, at 15 (stating that "compliance, or the appearance of
compliance with constitutional norms is not always enough to allay public concern").
340. See Kamar, supra note 28, at 1938 (stating that herd behavior plays a role in the
convergence of corporate law).
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Delaware for all large corporations will be less successful than a
34 1
focused approach.
Ultimately, only time and experience will determine the
success of the Michigan Cyber Court and the Maryland proposal. Each
proposal has its own advantages: Maryland may attract more litigants
because of its less radical departure from current norms, while
Michigan's potential for efficiency and its ability to reach out-of-state
litigants may prove more effective. However, even if neither state
succeeds in its goal of attracting high-technology businesses to the
forum state, reducing the strain on trial courts through the removal of
time-consuming business cases is likely to improve the states' judicial
systems.
Furthermore, especially in Michigan's case, the cyber court
may prove to be a useful model for states to transport from the
business arena to other areas of law. If these high-tech methods prove
successful in increasing efficiency, each state has the responsibility
not to withhold this technology from other, less powerful interest
groups. In the interest of fair and impartial justice, each state should
offer effective technology to all litigants, whenever constitutionally
permissible. 34 2 Such an effort would remove some of the speculation
that specialized business courts are elite forms of justice that cater
43
only to the haves and not the have-nots.
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341. For a discussion of innovation in other states' laws, see Romano, supra note 6, at 71317.

342. See Lederer, supra note 75, at 844 (arguing that unless courts turn away from
technology, the virtual courtroom will become ubiquitous).
343. See Ember Reichgott Junge, Business Courts: Efficient Justice, or Two-Tiered Elitism?,
24 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 315, 318 (1998) (observing that business courts may benefit the elite
at the expense of the poor); see also Bebchuk, supra note 255, at 1509 (observing that state
competition may favor management and controlling shareholders over public shareholders).
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